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Abstract
What are scientific theories and how should they be represented?
In this paper I propose a causal-structural account, according to
which scientific theories are to be represented as sets of interrelated
causal and credal nets. In contrast with other accounts of scientific
theories (such as Sneedian structuralism, Kitcher’s unificationist
view, and Darden’s theory of theoretical components), this leaves
room for causality to play a substantial role. As a result, an
interesting account of explanation is provided which sheds light on
explanatory unification within a causalist framework. The theory of
classical genetics is used as a case study.
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1 Introduction
What are scientific theories and how should they be represented? In this
paper, I propose a causal-structural account according to which scientific
theories are to be represented as sets of interrelated causal and credal nets.
The theory of classical genetics will be used as a case study and several
philosophical topics (relating to exemplars, anomalies, explanation and
unification) will be explored.
What scientific theories are and how they should be represented, have
been very pressing questions in 20th century philosophy of science. In
search for an answer, many have used the theory of classical genetics as a
case study. Woodger ([1929], [1952], [1959]) has provided an elaborate
reconstruction of classical genetics within the neopositivist axiomatic
framework. Balzer and Lorenzano ([2000]) and others have discussed
classical genetics extensively within the Sneedian structuralist framework
(based on Balzer et al. [1987]).1 Others have used the case of classical
genetics to address related questions about theory change in science
(Darden [1991]), or about explanation and unification (Kitcher [1989]).
Unfortunately, causality plays no substantial role in any of the above
accounts. During the past decades, however, more and more philosophers
have stressed the centrality of causality in, among other things,
explanation. If they are correct, which I think they are, and if scientific
theories can be used for explanation, which I think they can, then we need
an account of scientific theories that allows us to represent their causal
structure (see section 4 for a more elaborate discussion of causality and
explanation). It will emerge that my causal-structural approach, which
builds on Woodward’s interventionist account of causation and on the
theory of causal Bayes nets, is very suitable to that task. It naturally
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represents both the qualitative and the quantitative aspects of the causal
structure of classical genetics in an integrated way. It also results in an
interesting account of explanation which allows us to get a grip on
explanatory unification within a causalist framework. Moreover, it offers a
nice explication of lawfulness in classical genetics and in the special
sciences in general (see section 17). A final advantage, which I will not
stress here, is that it can easily be implemented in computers and AI; see
the tools developed by Spirtes et al. ([2000]), such as TETRAD. Some of
the leading figures discussed in this paper have endeavoured a similar
advantage in the past, using different tools such as PROLOG (Balzer and
Lorenzano [2000], p. 243) and SUTTON (Darden and Rada [1988]).
This paper consists of three parts. In the first part (sections 2-6) I will
set the stage. In section 2 I introduce the reader to the main concepts of
classical genetics. In section 3, I briefly present three existing philosophical
accounts of classical genetics, by the structuralists, by Kitcher and by
Darden. Their ideas will play an important role in this paper and I will try
to accommodate several of them. Yet I will also point to a very important
lacuna they in common: they have no substantial role for causality to play
(section 4). Finally, I will sketch Woodward’s interventionist account of
causation (section 5) and the basic formal concepts to be used in this
paper: causal nets, credal nets, and several kinds of isomorphism relations
(section 6).
In the second part (sections 7-16), I will present the causal-structural
account of scientific theories by applying it to the theory of classical
genetics. More specifically, I present classical genetics’ qualitative causal
structure (section 7), its application to monohybrid crosses with complete
dominance (sections 8 and 10) and incomplete dominance (section 12), and
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its application to multihybrid crosses with independent assortment (section
14) and with linkage and crossing over (sections 15-16). Meanwhile, I also
present a causal-structural account of explanation (section 9) and glance at
Darden’s discussion of exemplars (section 11) and anomalies (section 13).
In the third part (sections 17–18), I will expand on the
causal-structural account of scientific explanation (section 17), and
highlight one of its important advantages, viz. that it allows us to get a
grip on explanatory unification within a causalist framework (section 18).
Finally, I conclude in section 19 by discussing the possible
generalizability of the causal-structural account of scientific theories.
2 The Theory of Classical Genetics
The theory of classical genetics has been developed roughly between 1900
and the end of the 1920’s. In the middle of the 19th century, Gregor
Mendel studied phenomena of inheritance and hybridization mainly by
experimenting with pea plants. He presented his seminal ideas in 1865. In
1866 these were published in his Versuche u¨ber Pflanzen-Hybriden (Mendel
[1865], [1933]). In 1900, his work again came to the fore, due to the works
of De Vries ([1900]), Correns ([1900]) and, shortly afterwards, Bateson
([1900], [1902]). Almost thirty years later, Thomas Hunt Morgan published
the second edition of The Theory of the Gene (1928). This can be
considered an end-point in the development of classical genetics (Darden
[1991], pp. 3 and 38). In this paper, I will use Morgan’s exposition as my
main source for exploring the structure of classical genetics. But first I will
introduce the main concepts of classical genetics based on a contemporary
textbook (Klug et al. [2006]).
The main aim of classical genetics is to explain the distribution of
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observable traits in the offspring of two (groups of) crossed organisms
(Klug et al. [2006], chapters 3–5). For example, why is it that after
crossing true-breeding tall pea plants with short pea plants all the
resulting offspring is tall?2 And why is it that after crossing this offspring
with short pea plants, half of the resulting plants are tall whereas the
other half are short?
Traits (such as tall and short) are alternative forms of the same
character (in casu stem length in pea plants). (Klug et al. [2006], p. 40)
They are assumed to be coded for (or caused) by the organism’s genes.
Alleles are alternative forms of genes. (Klug et al. [2006], p. 42) For
example, there exists an allele for tall stems and an allele for short stems.
(Other genes may have more than two possible alleles; Klug et al. [2006],
section 4.5.) An organism’s observable features are called its phenotype;
the set of its alleles for a given character (or set of characters) is called its
genotype. (Klug et al. [2006], p. 42) In their experiments, classical
geneticists focussed on the transmission of one character (monohybrid
crosses), or more characters (dihybrid, trihybrid, . . . crosses). (Klug et al.
[2006], pp. 40–4) The number of copies an organism has of each gene
depends on its number of chromosomes. In this paper, I will focus on
diploid organisms. These have two copies of each chromosome, and hence
two copies of each gene. (Klug et al. [2006], p. 20) If both copies are
identical (the same allele), the individual is homozygous, otherwise it is
heterozygous. (Klug et al. [2006], p. 42) The specific location of a specific
gene on its chromosome is called its locus (plural: loci) (Klug et al. [2006],
p. 51).
Alleles are transmitted to the next generation via the gametes or
germ-cells. Barring cases of crossing-over, each germ-cell receives one
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member of each pair of chromosomes, and hence one copy of each gene
(Klug et al. [2006], pp. 27–30). By invoking certain hypotheses about this
process, the distribution of genotypes (and hence of phenotypes) in the
offspring can be explained. With respect to each pair of alleles, the law of
segregation states that during gamete formation, the paired alleles separate
or segregate randomly, so that each germ-cell receives one or the other
with equal likelihood. (Klug et al. [2006], p. 42) When multiple pairs of
alleles are investigated (as is the case in multihybrid crosses) extra
assumptions are needed. Mendel assumed that the transmission of one pair
of alleles was independent of the transmission of other pairs. This was
later called the law of independent assortment (Klug et al. [2006], p. 46).
This law holds only for genes that lie on different chromosomes. Genes
lying on the same chromosome are said to be linked (Klug et al. [2006], p.
101). Normally, gametes do not receive exact copies of the original
chromosomes. Homologous chromosomes (chromosomes of the same pair)
typically exchange part of their material (crossing-over). As a result,
linkage is normally incomplete (Klug et al. [2006], p. 101).
Other hypotheses pertain to the relation between genotype and
phenotype. The best-known principle is complete dominance. For example,
a pea plant that is heterozygous for stem length is tall (the tall-allele is
dominant, the short-allele is recessive). Not all characters show complete
dominance, however (see section 12).
3 Three Philosophical Accounts of the Theory of Classical
Genetics
In this section, I will briefly present three existing philosophical accounts
of the theory of classical genetics: by the structuralists, by Kitcher and by
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Darden. Even though they have an important problem in common (they
all treat issues of causality in stepmotherly fashion; see section 4), these
three accounts definitely deserve our attention. I will focus on the
structuralist notions of ‘theory-element’, ‘T-theoreticity’ and explanation
as ‘embedding’, on Kitcher’s ‘general argument patterns’ and on Darden’s
notions of ‘theoretical component’ and ‘abstract explanatory pattern’. In
the rest of this paper, these notions will be translated into the language of
causal Bayes nets. This will prove to be fruitful in the construction of an
adequate account of scientific theories, of explanation and of unification.3
3.1 The structuralist account
Balzer Lorenzano ([2000]) have analysed the theory of classical genetics
within the Sneedian structuralist framework, in which mature scientific
theories are represented in terms of their logical models, i.e. set-theoretic
structures that satisfy particular statements or propositions (Balzer et al.
[1987], pp. 2–3). In the structuralist approach, scientific theories are rarely
treated as monolithic entities. They are usually represented as theory-nets:
partially ordered sets of theory-elements, which are the basic building
blocks of scientific theories (Balzer et al. [1987], p. 172). A theory-element
T = 〈K, I〉 consists of a core K and a limited domain of intended
applications I (Balzer et al. [1987], p. 39).
The theory-core K(T) = 〈Mp(T),M(T),Mpp(T),GC(T),GL(T)〉
consists of five elements (Balzer et al. [1987], p. 79). Mp(T), the set of T’s
potential models, consists of those set-theoretic structures that can be
subsumed under T’s conceptual framework; i.e. the structures for which it
makes sense to ask whether they satisfy T’s laws (Balzer et al. [1987], pp.
15–7). M(T) is the set of T’s models, i.e. those potential models that
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satisfy T’s laws (hence M(T) ⊂Mp(T)) (Balzer et al. [1987], pp. 3 and
15–7). Mpp(T) is the set of T’s partial potential models, i.e. those
fragments of the potential models which contain only T’s non-theoretical
conceptual apparatus (Balzer et al. [1987], pp. 56–7). Roughly speaking, a
concept is T-non-theoretical if there are ways of determining or measuring
that concept which do not invoke T’s laws, and T-theoretical otherwise
(Balzer et al. [1987], pp. 50ff). For example, in classical genetics,
‘phenotype’ is a non-theoretical concept; ‘genotype’ is theoretical (see
section 7).4 Partial potential models can be ‘extended’ to potential models
by adding suitable T-theoretical relations (Balzer et al. [1987], pp. 56–7).
T’s constraints, GC(T), characterize the connections among the different
local applications of T (Balzer et al. [1987], pp. 40–1 and 78). For
example, one constraint may state that the same genotype used in two
different models will produce the same phenotype in these respective
models (Balzer and Lorenzano [2000], p. 254). Finally, T’s intertheoretical
links, GL(T), represent the transfer of data from another theory T′ to T
(Balzer et al. [1987], pp. 58 and 79). Such transfer is needed for measuring
T-non-theoretical concepts.
The set of intended applications I describes the phenomena that T
should account for (Balzer et al. [1987], pp. 86–9). The intended
applications have the structure of partial potential models. But Mpp
contains all of T’s possible applications (even ‘purely mathematical’
structures), not all of which are intended; therefore, I ⊆Mpp. The
distinction between merely possible applications and intended possible
applications cannot be made in a purely formal way (Balzer et al. [1987],
pp. 88–9). Often, the set of intended applications is specified by citing a
few ‘paradigms’ or ‘exemplars’ (such as ‘the pendulum’ and ‘the projectile’
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in classical particle mechanics). Systems that are sufficiently similar to
these exemplars are then said to belong to I.
To explain some given data or phenomena by means of T, one
proceeds as follows (Balzer et al. [1987], p. 23). By assumption, the data
have the structure of one of T’s partial potential models (some
Mpp ∈Mpp). By adding T’s theoretical concepts, one creates a potential
model (some Mp ∈Mp); this ‘embedding’ of the data in a potential model
is the conceptual aspect of the application of T. Then one asserts that the
data satisfy the laws of T, i.e. that Mp is an actual model of T (Mp ∈M).
This assertion has empirical consequences which, if they turn out to be
true, show that we have successfully applied T to I.
To simplify matters, Balzer and Lorenzano do not distinguish between
actual, potential and partial potential models. In their reconstruction, all
the models of classical genetics consist of eight components: a set J of
genetic individuals (these are individual organisms or populations thereof),
a set P of phenotypes, a set G of genotypes, and five functions relating
these sets to one another (e.g., APPEARANCE is a function mapping
individuals to their phenotypes) ([2000], pp. 246–9). Different
theory-elements are obtained by specifying the number of genes that are
investigated, or by specifying the precise mathematical form of the models’
functions. They distinguish, among other things, between theory-elements
for monohybrid crosses with complete dominance, for monohybrid crosses
with incomplete dominance, for dihybrid crosses with independent
assortment, etc.; together, these theory-elements form the theory-net of
classical genetics ([2000], pp. 260–2). Data are explained by embedding
them in one of classical genetics’ models ([2000], p. 3).
Like Balzer and Lorenzano, I will discuss the different
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‘theory-elements’ of classical genetics separately and I will explore their
formal interrelations (albeit using a different formal apparatus). I will also
adopt the notion of ‘T-theoreticity’ and of explanation as ‘embedding’.
These ideas, together with some of Kitcher’s and Darden’s, will help to get
an adequate grip on explanatory unification.
3.2 Kitcher’s unificationism
Kitcher’s main research question is not how to represent scientific theories,
but how to build a unificationist theory of explanation.
According to Kitcher ([1989], p. 447), scientific theories are
constituted by patterns of derivation or general argument patterns, which
are defined as follows:5
A schematic sentence is an expression obtained by replacing
some, but not necessarily all, the nonlogical expressions
occurring in a sentence with dummy letters. [. . . ] A set of
filling instructions for a schematic sentence is a set of
directions for replacing the dummy letters of the schematic
sentence, such that, for each dummy letter, there is a direction
that tells us how it should be replaced. [. . . ] A schematic
argument is a sequence of schematic sentences. A classification
for a schematic argument is a set of statements describing the
inferential characteristics of the schematic argument: it tells us
which terms of the sequence are to be regarded as premises,
which are inferred from which, what rules of inference are used,
and so forth. Finally, a general argument pattern is a triple
consisting of a schematic argument, a set of sets of filling
instructions and a classification for the schematic argument.
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(Kitcher [1989], p. 432, original emphasis)
Kitcher ([1989], pp. 438–42) characterizes classical genetics as a set of
patterns that serve to answer specific types of questions:
What is the expected distribution of phenotypes in a particular
generation? Why should we expect to get that distribution?
What is the probability that a particular phenotype will result
from a particular mating?, and so forth. (Kitcher [1989], p. 438)
The general idea common to all patterns is that these questions may be
answered
[. . . ] by making hypotheses about the relevant genes, their
phenotypic effects, and their distribution among the individuals
in the pedigree. (Kitcher [1989], pp. 438–9)
The simplest pattern, for example, is called Mendel and has four premises
(Kitcher [1989], p. 439). The first premise says that there are two alleles A
and a, where A is dominant and a recessive. It is a schematic sentence
with A and a as dummy letters. The filling instructions state that these
are to be replaced with names of alleles. The second premise says that AA
and Aa individuals have trait P , whereas aa individuals have trait P ′. The
dummy letters P and P ′ are to be replaced with names of phenotypic
traits. The third premise is a list specifying the genotypes of all the
individuals involved. And the fourth premise says that ‘For any individual
x and any alleles yz if x has yz then the probability that x will transmit y
to any one of its offspring is 1/2’ (Kitcher [1989], p. 439). This is the law
of segregation. From these premises, the expected distribution of progeny
phenotypes can be derived by filling in the dummy letters. Mendel is
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limited to cases with only one gene and two possible alleles, and with
complete dominance. Other, more complicated patterns (called Refined
Mendel and Morgan) are more encompassing (Kitcher [1989], pp. 440–1).
3.3 Darden and theory change in science
Darden’s main research question is how scientific theories change over
time, how new scientific ideas are developed, and what strategies there are
for theory change in science (Darden [1991]). To that end, she analyses the
theory of classical genetics in terms of theoretical components, ‘parts of the
theory that change over time’ (Darden [1991], p. 18). For example, between
1900 and 1903 Mendelian genetics incorporated the following component:
Unit-characters: (1) An organism is to be viewed as composed
of separable unit-characters. (Adapted from Darden [1991], p.
168)
This component gradually evolved. Where, according to Darden, no
distinction was made in 1900–1903 between observable traits and
underlying elements or factors, that distinction was evident as of 1910:
Factors and characters. (1’) Characters are produced by
factors. (2a’) One factor may produce one character or (2b’)
multiple factors may interact in the production of one
character. (Adapted from Darden [1991], p. 168)
By 1926, this evolved into the following:
Genes and characters: (1”) Genes cause characters. (2a”) One
gene may cause one character or (2b”) multiple factors (genes
at different loci in linkage groups) may interact in causing one
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character or (2c”) one gene may affect many characters.
(Adapted from Darden [1991], p. 169)
Theoretical components are not the same as structuralist
theory-elements. First, a single theory-element may (and usually does)
satisfy more than one law or explanatory principle. Theoretical
components are such explanatory principles. Hence theory-elements consist
of more than one theoretical component. (In section 17, I will expand on
my views on laws and explanatory principles.) Second, whereas theoretical
components are inherently dynamic, theory-elements are more or less
stable end-products of such theory evolution (but see Balzer et al. [1987],
chapter V, for an account of the diachronic structure of theories). Darden’s
analogue of a theory-element is an abstract explanatory pattern—a notion
derived from Kitcher. Each pattern invokes a number of theoretical
components and is introduced by means of one or more exemplars or
paradigmatic crosses (see section 11).
4 A Common Lacuna: Where is Causality?
These three accounts of the theory of classical genetics have one lacuna in
common: to a greater or lesser extent, they treat issues of causality in
stepmotherly fashion.
First, Balzer et al. ([1987]) do not discuss the difference between causal
and non-causal relations or laws. It could well be that (some of) a theory’s
laws are causal, but the structuralist framework lacks the expressive power
to say so. As a result, the structuralist account of explanation (see section
3.1) is a-causal. Moreover, it is also intended as an account of prediction;
no distinction is made between prediction and explanation. And even
when they apply their framework to overtly causal theories such as
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classical genetics, the structuralists are reluctant to make room for
causality. Balzer and Lorenzano, for example, talk about phenotypes being
‘caused’ (with quotation marks!) by genotypes ([2000], pp. 247–8).6
A notable exception in the structuralist literature is Forge ([2002]),
who goes some way to giving a structuralist account of causal explanation.
He conjectures that in structuralist reconstructions of scientific theories,
causes can be represented by (unconstrained) theoretical concepts or
functions ([2002], p. 113). While this conjecture is interesting, two remarks
should be made. First, Forge focuses on scientific theories in the physical
sciences and it is an open question whether his conjecture would apply to
the theory of classical genetics as well. Second, and more importantly, a
function or concept that is theoretical for a theory T1 may be
non-theoretical for some other theory T2. But that would make it
non-causal for T2 by definition. This is an unwelcome consequence of
Forge’s conjecture.
Second, Kitcher explicitly discusses the notion of causation, but he
‘explains it away’. Because of well-known empiricist concerns, he refuses to
adopt a causal account of explanation (Kitcher [1989], p. 435). Instead he
develops an explanatory account of causation: ‘What is distinctive about
the unification view is that it proposes to ground causal claims in claims
about explanatory dependency rather than vice versa.’ (Kitcher [1989], p.
436) Causal relevance is dependent on explanatory relevance, where the
latter is tied to the systematization of belief in the limit of scientific
inquiry, as guided by the search for derivational unification (Kitcher [1989],
p. 499).7
Third, Darden is less reluctant to talk about causality in her account
of classical genetics. She acknowledges that causal considerations did play
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a role in genetics and cytology (Darden [1991], pp. 253–4), especially in the
Morgan group (Darden [1991], p. 183), and she uses causal language when
formulating the theoretical components of Mendelian genetics (see the
examples cited in section 3.3). But for all that, she pays relatively little
attention to causation in classical genetics. Nor does she give an account of
causation.
One may wonder, of course, whether causality really is that
important.8 In my opinion, there are multiple reasons why causality merits
particular attention in our representations of scientific theories, the most
important one being related to explanation.9 For many philosophers,
explanation is tightly connected to causation; see the causal-mechanical
accounts of Salmon ([1984]) and Dowe ([2000]), the interventionist
accounts of Hausman ([1998]) and Woodward ([2003]), and the mechanistic
accounts of Machamer et al. ([2000]), Glennan ([1996], [2002]), Bechtel and
Abrahamsen ([2005]) and Craver ([2007]).
One of the central motivations for stressing the role of causality in
explanation is that it solves several of the problems that notoriously plague
Hempel’s ([1965]) deductive-nomological (DN) model of explanation.
(Woodward [2009], section 2.5) One such problem is explanatory
asymmetry. One may logically derive, and hence DN -explain, the length of
a flagpole’s shadow from its height, together with certain laws and initial
conditions. Likewise, one may derive, and hence DN -explain, its height
from the length of its shadow, again together with certain laws and initial
conditions. But whereas the first derivation seems explanatory, the second
does not. Kitcher ([1989], pp. 485–7) endeavours to solve this problem
within his unificationist model, but he arguably fails (Woodward [2003],
pp. 358–60; Gijsbers [2007], pp. 489–91). Causal considerations, by
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contrast, fit this intuition well: the length of the shadow is caused by the
length of the flagpole, but not vice versa.
Before turning to the next section, I would like to add one remark on
the relation between explanation and causality. Even though I endorse the
view that causality plays an important role in explanation, I do not wish
to say that all explanation is causal explanation. Mathematical
explanations, for example, may well be a-causal (see Mancosu [2011],
section 1 and Woodward [2003], pp. 220–1) and they may better fit
Hempel’s or Kitcher’s account of explanation. That need not be a
problem; after all it seems doubtful that there can be a truly general
account of explanation that holds in all possible domains of inquiry (cf.
note 25). Still, if causal considerations are relevant, they should better be
taken into account. This surely holds in the case of classical genetics, as I
will argue in the next section.
5 Woodward’s Interventionist Account of Causation
My account of the causal structure of classical genetics builds upon
Woodward’s interventionist theory of causation. The central idea of this
theory is that causal relations ‘are potentially exploitable for purposes of
manipulation and control’ (Woodward [2003], p. v). For two reasons,
Woodward’s theory is well suited for my purposes.10 First, it dovetails
with (large part of) the literature on causal Bayes nets, such as the works
of Pearl ([2000]) and Spirtes et al. ([2000]) (see Woodward [2003], pp.
38–45). Second, it also nicely fits the concept of causality as it figured in
classical genetics. As Waters ([2007], section I) points out, classical
geneticists considered genes as difference makers for phenotypic traits in
the way specified by the difference principle (see Waters [1994], p. 172 for a
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seminal version of this principle):
Difference principle: differences in a gene cause uniform phenotypic
differences in particular genetic and environmental contexts. (Waters
[2007], p. 558)
In well-devised experiments, these classical geneticists created a stable
genetic and environmental context so as to make sure that the difference
principle would apply (Waters [2007], p. 558). This principle, Waters
contends, can be naturally reformulated in terms of manipulations of genes
(in the sense of the ‘ideal interventions’ to be discussed below) given
certain genetic and environmental contexts (Waters [2007], p. 564).
Woodward ([2003], p. 39) conceives of the relata of causal relations as
random variables (more precisely: changes in the values thereof).
Intuitively, a random variable represents some feature of an entity or set of
entities. Each random variable can have several possible values, each of
which represents a different state that the feature can take. For example,
the variable ‘TrafficLights’ can take ‘red’, ‘orange’ and ‘green’ as its
possible values.
The basic intuition underlying Woodward’s account of causation is
that one random variable X is a (type-level) cause of another random
variable Y just in case manipulating X would result in a change in Y (or
in the probability distribution of Y ). Of course, not every manipulation of
X would be suitable. If, for example, the manipulation of X would change
Y directly, or if it would change some of the causes of Y that are not
themselves effects of X, then Y would change irrespective of whether X is
a cause of Y . To rule out such problems, Woodward introduces the notion
of an ideal intervention on X with respect to Y to explicate changes in X
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which influence Y , if at all, only via X and not via some other causal route
(see Woodward [2003], p. 94 for an informal characterization and 98–99 for
a precise definition). If the relation between X and Y remains ‘invariant’,
that is, continues to hold, under some range of such ideal interventions on
X, then it is causal. It is not necessary that it is invariant under all
possible interventions on X; ‘invariance under interventions’ is a gradual
notion (Woodward [2003], pp. 257–65). With the help of the notion of
ideal interventions, Woodward defines ‘direct causation’ (relative to a set
of variables V ) as follows (this notion nicely fits the formal framework of
causal Bayes nets.):
(DC) A necessary and sufficient condition of X to be a direct cause of Y
with respect to some variable set V is that there be a possible
intervention on X that will change Y (or the probability distribution
of Y ) when all other variables in V besides X and Y are held fixed at
some value by interventions. (Woodward [2003], p. 55)
6 Causal Bayes Nets and Their Interrelations
In this section, I first introduce the basic terminology of causal Bayes nets
(6.1). Then I introduce some new concepts: various isomorphism relations
for causal nets and their constituents (6.2). Finally, I discuss a related
concept—credal nets—and define corresponding isomorphism relations
(6.3). Causal nets will play the same role as models in the structuralist
framework. Credal nets will serve in the creation of a causal analogue for
structuralist theory-elements and Darden’s abstract explanatory patterns.
And the isomorphism relations will help to explore classical genetics’
unifying power.
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6.1 Causal Bayes nets
A causal net (or causal Bayesian network) is a causally interpreted
Bayesian network. A Bayesian network B = 〈G,P 〉 consists of a directed
acyclic graph G = 〈V,E〉 and a probability distribution P (V ) over a set of
random variables V , where P (V ) and G satisfy the Markov Condition. (If
it is clear over which set of variables a distribution is defined, I will write
P instead of P (V ).) A directed acyclic graph G = 〈V,E〉 consists of a set
V of vertices or nodes (this is the set of random variables on which B is
defined), and a set E of directed edges (A→ B, where A,B ∈ V ). Since G
is acyclic, there is no directed path from any variable to itself.
To interpret a Bayesian network causally (and hence to treat it as a
causal net) is to interpret the edges in E causally, so that for all vertices
A,B ∈ V , A→ B ∈ E if and only if A is a direct cause of B, relative to V .
The notion of ‘direct cause’ can be defined by means of Woodward’s (DC).
In the case of causal nets, the Markov Condition is called the Causal
Markov Condition. Let DESC(A) consist of all variables B ∈ V such that
in G there is a directed path from A to B (these are the graph-theoretical
‘descendants’ of A); and let PA(A) consist of all C ∈ V such that
C → A ∈ E (these are the graph-theoretical ‘parents’ of A).
Definition 1 (Causal Markov Condition) Let G = 〈V,E〉 be a causal
graph with vertex set V and P be a probability distribution over the vertices
in V generated by the causal structure represented by G. G and P satisfy
the Causal Markov Condition if and only if for every A ∈ V , A is
independent of V \ (DESC(A) ∪ PA(A)) given PA(A).11 (Adapted from
Spirtes et al. [2000], p. 29)
The Causal Markov Condition specifies which conditional or
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unconditional independence relations a probability distribution P must
satisfy in order to be causally Markov with respect to a given graph G, so
that B = 〈G,P 〉 counts as a causal net.12 This can be illustrated by means
of figure 1. PT1 is independent of GC1 conditional on GT1 in any P that is
causally Markov to figure 1; likewise, GC1 and GC2 are unconditionally
independent. (At the moment, the reader need not care about what these
variables stand for or which causal relations this figure depicts.)
6.2 Relations among causal nets
As is evident from the above definitions, causal nets may differ from each
other along several lines: viz. with respect to V and/or E and/or P . Here
I will define several possible relations between sets of variables, between
graphs, and between causal nets that are helpful to analyse the causal
structure of classical genetics.
But first let me introduce some notation pertaining to random
variables. Each random variable A ∈ V may assume a range of possible
values. These are mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive. Let [A] be the
set of A’s values. In this paper, I will only deal with finite random
variables (variables with a finite number of values). Where
U = {A1, . . . , An} is a set of variables, let [U ] = [A1]× . . .× [An]. The
members of [U ] thus consist of the possible configurations of members of
[A1], . . . , [An], respectively.
13 Finally, let [[U ]] =
⋃
[Ai] (for all Ai ∈ U).
Obviously, [U ] and [[U ]] are different sets.
Now we are ready to define some possible interrelations between
causal nets. I will start with isomorphism and value-isomorphism, defining
these notions in turn for sets of variables, for graphs, and for causal nets.
Definition 2 ((value-)isomorphism for sets of variables) Two sets
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of variables V and V ′ are isomorphic if and only if there is a bijection
b : V → V ′.14 They are value-isomorphic if and only if there are bijections
b : V → V ′ and b′ : [[V ]]→ [[V ′]] such that for any A ∈ V and a ∈ [[V ]],
a ∈ [A] if and only if b′(a) ∈ [b(A)].
Definition 3 ((value-)isomorphism for graphs) Two graphs
G = 〈V,E〉 and G′ = 〈V ′, E′〉 are isomorphic if and only if there is a
bijection b : V → V ′ such that for any A,B ∈ V : A→ B ∈ E if and only if
b(A)→ b(B) ∈ E′. They are value-isomorphic if and only if they are
isomorphic and V and V ′ are value-isomorphic.
Definition 4 ((value-)isomorphism for causal nets) Two causal nets
B = 〈G,P 〉 and B′ = 〈G′, P ′〉 are isomorphic if and only if G and G′ are
isomorphic. They are value-isomorphic if and only if G and G′ are
value-isomorphic.
With respect to isomorphic graphs and causal nets, let me introduce
the following convention:
Convention 1 If G = 〈V,E〉 and G′ = 〈V ′, E′〉 are isomorphic, I will
write G′ = 〈V ′, E〉 instead of G′ = 〈V ′, E′〉—even if E and E′ are specified
over different sets of variables. Analogously, I will write B′ = 〈〈V ′, E〉, P ′〉
instead of B′ = 〈〈V ′, E′〉, P ′〉 in case B and B′ are isomorphic.
The relations of isomorphism and value-isomorphism of definition 4
concern structural (or qualitative) similarities between causal nets. Let us
now turn to probabilistic (or quantitative) similarities.
Definition 5 (distribution-identity for causal nets) Let B = 〈〈V,E〉,
P 〉 and B′ = 〈〈V ′, E〉, P ′〉 be value-isomorphic and let b and b′ be bijections
as in definition 2. Moreover, for every u = 〈a1, a2, . . . , an〉 ∈ [V ], let
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b′(u) = 〈b′(a1), b′(a2), . . . , b′(an)〉. Then B and B′ are distribution-identical
if and only if P (u) = P ′(b′(u)) for each u ∈ [V ]. (In other words, B and B′
have like joint distributions.)
The relations between these definitions are obvious. If two sets of
variables V and V ′ are value-isomorphic they are also isomorphic, but not
vice versa. (Idem for graphs and causal nets.) If two causal nets B and B′
are isomorphic (resp. value-isomorphic), then so are their respective graphs
and hence their respective sets of variables, but not vice versa. And if two
causal nets are distribution-identical they are value-isomorphic, but not
vice versa.
6.3 Credal nets and their interrelations
Along with causal nets, I will use another concept that ties graphs and
probability distributions together: credal nets. A credal net is a set of
Bayesian networks over a fixed set of variables (Cozman [2005], p. 171).15
These Bayes nets all have the same G, but differ with respect to P . More
precisely, a credal net B = 〈G,P〉 consists of a directed acyclic graph
G = 〈V,E〉 and a set P of probability distributions over V , called a a credal
set. As I interpret Bayes nets causally here, I will carry over this
interpretation to credal nets.
Definition 6 (credal net) A credal net is a set of causal nets with a
common graph: B = 〈G,P〉 = {B = 〈G,P 〉 | P ∈ P}.
Structural (qualitative) and probabilistic (quantitative) similarity
relations can also be defined for credal sets and credal nets:
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Definition 7 ((value-)isomorphism for credal sets) Two credal sets
P(V ) and P′(V ′) are isomorphic if and only if V and V ′ are isomorphic.
They are value-isomorphic if and only if V and V ′ are value-isomorphic.
Definition 8 (distribution-identity for credal sets) Let V and V ′ be
value-isomorphic, let b and b′ be bijections as in definition 2, and let u and
b′(u) be defined as in definition 5. Then the credal sets P(V ) and P′(V ′)
are distribution-identical if and only if there is a bijection b′′ : P→ P′ such
that P (u) = b′′(P )(b′(u)) for all P ∈ P and all u ∈ [V ]. (In other words, all
distributions in P are distribution-identical to their image in P′.)
Definition 9 ((value-)isomorphism for credal nets) Two credal nets
B = 〈G,P〉 and B′ = 〈G′,P′〉 are isomorphic if and only if G and G′ are
isomorphic. They are value-isomorphic if and only if G and G′ are
value-isomorphic.
Definition 10 (distribution-identity for credal nets) Two credal
nets B = 〈〈V,E〉,P〉 and B′ = 〈〈V ′, E〉,P′〉 are distribution-identical if and
only if P(V ) and P′(V ′) are distribution-identical. Equivalently, B and B′
are distribution-identical if and only if there is a bijection b∗ : B→ B′
such that for all B ∈ B, B is distribution-identical to b∗(B).
The relations between these definitions are obvious. If two credal sets
P and P′ are distribution-identical they are also value-isomorphic, and
hence also isomorphic, but not vice versa. (Idem for credal nets.) And if
two credal nets B and B′ are distribution-identical, then so are their
respective credal sets. (Idem for value-isomorphism and isomorphism.)
Overview of the above definitions:
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(value-)isomorphism distribution-identity
sets of variables definition 2 /
graphs definition 3 /
causal nets definition 4 definition 5
credal sets definition 7 definition 8
credal nets definition 9 definition 10
7 The Theory of the Gene and its Causal Graph
Let us turn now to the second part of this paper and apply the above
formal framework to Morgan’s exposition of the ‘theory of the gene’
(Morgan [1928]). According to Morgan, the modern theory of heredity ‘is
primarily concerned with the distribution of units between successive
generations of individuals’ (Morgan [1928], p. 1). These units are invisible
and they are called genes. To these genes, properties are assigned in a
non-arbitrary way, based on ‘numerical data obtained by crossing two
individuals that differ in one or more characters’ (Morgan [1928], p. 1).
After presenting several examples of possible relations between genes and
characters, Morgan formulates the theory of the gene as follows (the three
following quotes are from Morgan [1928], p. 25):
We are now in a position to formulate the theory of the gene.
The theory states that the characters of the individual are
referable to paired elements (genes) in the germinal material
that are held together in a definite number of linkage groups;
Where Morgan writes about ‘pairs of genes’, we would now say ‘pairs of
alleles.’ Linkage groups are groups of genes that are typically transmitted
together (since they lie on the same chromosome). Morgan continues by
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specifying the law of segregation (Mendel’s first law) and the law of
independent assortment (Mendel’s second law):
it states that the members of each pair of genes separate when
the germ-cells mature in accordance with Mendel’s first law,
and in consequence each germ-cell comes to contain one set
only; it states that the members belonging to different linkage
groups assort independently in accordance with Mendel’s
second law;
Finally he explains the basics of ‘gene mapping’, the technique by means of
which the Morgan group was able to discover which of an organism’s genes
belonged to the same linkage group (and in what order):
it states that an orderly interchange—crossing-over—also takes
place, at times, between the elements in corresponding linkage
groups; and it states that the frequency of crossing-over
furnishes evidence of the linear order of the elements in each
linkage group and of the relative position of the elements with
respect to each other.
The theory of the gene, as it is presented by Morgan, is not one single
theory. It is composed of different abstract explanatory patterns (Darden
[1991]), general argument patterns (Kitcher [1989]), or theory-elements
forming a theory-net (Balzer and Lorenzano [2000]). I will incorporate this
aspect by representing it by means of interrelated credal nets. As these
credal nets are interpreted causally, the common lacuna is remedied. To
some extent these credal nets share the same causal structure. This
common causal structure ties them together, and distinguishes the theory
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Figure 1: The causal structure of classical genetics
of the gene from alternative theories of inheritance such as Francis Galton’s
(see Leuridan [2007] for a brief characterization of Galton’s theory).
This shared causal structure is shown in figure 1. The directed acyclic
graph comprises nine nodes, which represent the genotype (GTi), the
phenotype (PTi) and the make-up of the germ-cells (GCi) of three groups
of organisms (a paternal group, i = 1; a maternal group, i = 2; and a filial
group, i = 3).16 The GTi and GCi variables in figure 1 are dotted to
indicate that they are CG-theoretical in the structuralists’ sense (see
section 3.1; ‘CG’ stands for the theory of classical genetics). At the time,
there was no way to determine an organism’s genotype or the make-up of
its germ-cells without invoking the theory of classical genetics. The
phenotypic variables, by contrast, are CG-non-theoretical. One can
determine an organism’s phenotypic traits without relying on CG. This
point is important with respect to explanation in classical genetics (see
section 17).
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The causal relations between these variables are depicted in figure 1.
The genotypes (GTi) causally influence the corresponding phenotypes
(PTi), as well as the corresponding germ cells (GCi)—manipulating the
former via an ideal intervention will change (the probability distribution
over) the latter. And the parental germ cells (GC1 and GC2) together
causally determine the filial genotype GT3. These relations are very
plausible from a present-day point of view. But to avoid any allegation
that I’m misinterpreting Morgan’s exposition, we should briefly justify
them on the basis of his work.
In section 5, I have argued, based on (Waters [2007]), that
Woodward’s interventionism fits Morgan’s concept of causality. Here I
discuss the precise causal relations that played a role in Morgan’s theory of
the gene. Let me start with the relation between genes and characters. It
is very natural to consider genes as the causes of characters; i.e. to assume
that for each i, GTi → PTi. It is not so natural, however, to attribute this
assumption to Morgan and his contemporaries. Explicit causal language
was surprisingly rare in the genetics literature at the time. Still, Morgan
uses implicit causal language on repeated occasions. He hypothesizes that
the tall variety of pea plants ‘contains in its germ-cells something that
makes the plants tall’ (Morgan [1928], p. 2, my emphasis). He
distinguishes between red-producing genes and white-producing genes in
crosses of four-o’clocks (Morgan [1928], p. 8). And he talks about the
effects of mutant changes (Morgan [1928], p. 315). These examples should
suffice to show that, according to Morgan, genes cause characters (see also
Darden [1991], pp. 182–3 and Waters [2007]).
What about the relations between the paired genes and the germcells?
In the third and the fourth chapter of his book, Morgan lists overwhelming
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cytological evidence leading to the conclusion that GTi → GCi (1 ≤ i ≤ 3)
and that GC1 → CT3 ← GC2: the chromosomes are the bearers of the
genes ([1928], p. 45), somatic cells have a diploid number of chromosomes,
half of which come from the father, the other half from the mother ([1928],
p. 32), and the germ cells receive a haploid number of chromosomes
([1928], p. 33).
8 A First Exemplar: Stem Length in Pea Plants
Morgan ([1928]) presents the theory of classical genetics by means of a set
of exemplars, particular crosses which are explained by means of the
theory of the gene and which are supposed to represent a class of similar
phenomena. His first exemplar consists of Mendel’s well-known
monohybrid crosses with complete dominance on pea plants (Morgan
[1928], pp. 2–4). Recall that in a monohybrid cross only one pair of
opposing characteristics is studied.
8.1 Three crosses on stem length in pea plants
Mendel ([1865], pp. 5-27) crossed a tall variety of edible pea (Pisum) with
a short variety. The tall plants he used were true-breeding. He observed
that when true-breeding tall plants are crossed with short plants, all the
offspring or hybrids (F1) are tall (cross 1). It did not matter whether the
tall plants produced pollen and the short plants produced eggs or vice
versa. Reciprocal crosses gave identical results (Mendel [1865], pp. 8–9). In
a second cross (cross 2), self-fertilization of the F1-generation resulted in
offspring (F2) 75% of which was tall, the other 25% being short. Finally,
when the F1 hybrids (pollen plants) were back-crossed to short plants (egg
plants), 50% of the resulting off-spring F2′ was tall, the other 50% was
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short (cross 3). How can these phenotypic distributions be explained? It
will turn out in section 9 that the results of each cross can be explained by
fitting them in a causal net the graph of which is isomorphic to figure 1.
Here, I will first characterize the graph which these causal nets have in
common and the explanatory principles or laws their probability
distributions have to satisfy.
8.2 The causal graph for stem length in pea plants
Let us first give an appropriate interpretation for the nodes in figure 1 by
specifying their respective sets of possible values. All the plants in these
crosses are tall (PTi = tall) or short (PTi = short). These traits are
referable to paired alleles in the germinal material. Let t and s denote a
‘tall-producing’ and a ‘short-producing’ allele, respectively.17 There are
three possible configurations of paired alleles, i.e. three possible values for
the variables GTi, viz. tt, ts, and ss. Finally, the germ-cells contain one
allele of each pair. Hence, the variables GCi may assume the values t or s.
These specifications can be summarized as follows. Let
V 1 = {PT1, . . . , GC3} be a set of variables corresponding to the nodes in
figure 1. Let
[PTi] = {tall, short}, [GTi] = {tt, ts, ss}, and [GCi] = {t, s}, (1 ≤ i ≤ 3).
Let G1 = 〈V 1, E〉 be isomorphic to figure 1 (where PT1 ∈ V 1 corresponds
to the node PT1 in the graph, . . . ). This completes the description of G
1.
By adding probability distributions to this graph, we will obtain causal
nets that represent crosses 1 to 3. These probability distributions have to
satisfy the explanatory principles, or laws, invoked by Morgan.
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table 1 table 2 table 3
PTi GCi GT3
GTi tall short GTi t s GC1 GC2 tt ts ss
tt 1.00 0.00 tt 1.00 0.00 t t 1.00 0.00 0.00
ts 1.00 0.00 ts 0.50 0.50 t s 0.00 1.00 0.00
ss 0.00 1.00 ss 0.00 1.00 s t 0.00 1.00 0.00
s s 0.00 0.00 1.00
Conditional probability tables 1–3, satisfied by all P ∈ P1
8.3 Morgan’s explanatory principles and the credal net for
stem length in pea plants
To explain the phenotypic distributions of crosses 1 to 3, Morgan appeals
to four principles—either explicitly or implicitly ([1928], pp. 2–4). First, he
assumes that plants having two tall-producing alleles are tall; that hybrids,
which have an allele for tall and one for short, are tall; and that plants
having two short-producing alleles are short. This corresponds to what is
called the principle of complete dominance. They are summarized in
conditional probability table 1. This table specifies the probability
distribution over the values of each PTi, given the possible values of its
graphical parent GTi, (1 ≤ i ≤ 3). For example, the second row states that
P (PTi = tall | GTi = ts) = 1.00. This expresses the dominance of tall over
short.
Second, Morgan invokes the law of segregation (Mendel’s first law):
‘[i]f the element [or allele] for tall and the one for short (that are both
present in the hybrid) separate in the hybrid when the eggs and pollen
grains come to maturity, half the eggs will contain the tall and half the
short element [. . . ]. Similarly for the pollen grains’ (Morgan [1928], p. 3).
In this quote, Morgan only discusses segregation for hybrid plants, but
from his exposition of the underlying chromosomal mechanism, it is clear
that Mendel’s first law applies to true-breeding plants as well, see (Morgan
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[1928], pp. 33-4). The law of segregation is summarized in table 2.
A third, very implicit principle states that when an egg and a pollen
grain fertilize, their respective elements together make up the genotype of
the resulting offspring. I will call this the combination principle (table 3).18
Finally, Morgan assumes chance fertilization ([1928], p. 3). For
example, when one crosses or self-fertilizes hybrids it may not be the case
that tall-producing pollen have a tendency to fertilize tall-producing eggs
rather than short-producing eggs. This assumption need not be expressed
by means of a conditional probability table, as it holds for any probability
distribution that satisfies the Causal Markov Condition relative to figure
1.19
Together, these principles give rise to a credal set P1(V 1):
P1(V 1) = {P (V 1) | P (V 1) satisfies tables 1–3 and
the Causal Markov Condition relative to G1}.
Joined with G1, this defines a credal net B1 = 〈G1,P1〉.
9 Explaining Mendel’s Crosses: a Causal-Structural Account
Morgan explains the filial phenotypic distributions in crosses 1 to 3 by
deriving them, by means of the laws or explanatory principles just
discussed, from assumptions regarding the parental genotypes. Described
in this way, explanation is syntactic. But we can also approach it in a
semantic or model-theoretic way. Each of the crosses can be explained by
embedding them in a causal net (some B ∈ B1). This model-theoretic
approach mimics the structuralist account of explanation, while making
room for the concept of causality. Let me call it the causal-structural
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account of explanation. (See section 17 for a further elaboration.)
In section 3.1 we saw that for the structuralists, to explain some given
data by means of a theory T,20 one adds to these data—which have the
structure of a partial potential model—T’s theoretical concepts—thus
creating a potential model—and then shows that it is an actual model of
T. This ‘embedding’ can be translated to the language of causal nets.21
The data in section 8.1 concern the phenotypic distribution of the filial
group, given the phenotypes of the parental groups. Hence they pertain to
the CG-non-theoretic variables PTi (with [PTi] = {tall, short}, 1 ≤ i ≤ 3).
These can be included in a graph that also contains the CG-theoretical
variables GTi and GCi (1 ≤ i ≤ 3). By demanding that this graph is
isomorphic to figure 1 and by adding suitable probability distributions
which satisfy tables 1–3 and are causally Markov to the graph in question,
one obtains models (causal nets in B1) that incorporate classical genetics’
conceptual framework, satisfy its laws and explain the data.
Let us first turn to cross 1. In one variant of cross 1, the pollen plants
are true-breeding for tall and the egg plants are short:
PT1 = tall, PT2 = short. If it is assumed that a true-breeding tall plant
contains the element for tall twice (cf. Morgan [1928], p. 6), it can be
‘abduced’ that GT1 = tt and GT2 = ss.
22 If we denote the probability
distribution corresponding to this cross by P 1(V 1), or briefly P 1, we can
express this as follows: P 1(PT1 = tall) = P
1(PT2 = short) =
1.00, and P 1(GT1 = tt) = P
1(GT2 = ss) = 1.00. Assume now that
P 1 ∈ P1, so that it satisfies tables 1–3 and the corresponding explanatory
principles. Then it follows that P 1(GC1 = t) = P
1(GC2 = s) = 1.00 (by
table 2), and that P 1(GT3 = ts) = 1.00 (by table 3). Hence
P 1(PT3 = tall) = 1.00 (by table 1), which corresponds to the data. This
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shows that cross 1 can be represented by a causal net B1 = 〈G1, P 1〉 which
predicts that all hybrid offspring is tall. Since B1 satisfies causal
explanatory principles, this embedding of the data in B1 can rightly be
called causal explanation. It shows how the variables on which the data
report (in casu PT3) fit in a larger causal system, and how this causal
system brings about the (probability distribution over the) values of these
variables.23
The phenotypic distribution in cross 2 can be explained in an
analogous way, by embedding it in some causal net, say B2 = 〈G1, P 2〉,
where P 2 ∈ P1 so that B2 ∈ B1. In cross 2, the F1 hybrids are selfed and
they produce F2 offspring 75% of which is tall and 25% of which is short.
Obviously, if P 2(GT1 = ts) = P
2(GT2 = ts) = 1.00 and if P
2 ∈ P1, then
P 2(GT3 = tt) = 0.25, P
2(GT3 = ts) = 0.50, and P
2(GT3 = ss) = 0.25, so
that P 2(PT3 = tall) = 0.75 and P
2(PT3 = short) = 0.25. This
corresponds to the data.
Finally, in cross 3 the F1 hybrids are back-crossed with the recessive
parental plants. Let P 3(GT1 = ts) = P
3(GT2 = ss) = 1.00. If P
3 ∈ P1,
then P 3(PT3 = tall) = 0.50. ‘The results confirm the expectation.’
(Morgan [1928], p. 4) Hence, cross 3 can be represented by
B3 = 〈G1, P 3〉 ∈ B1.
Cross 3 was designed by Mendel (and cited by Morgan) as a test cross.
The fact that several different, but somehow similar crosses could be
explained by means of the same explanatory principles, raised confidence
that the explanatory principles invoked were not ad hoc.
So far we have seen that a number of crosses with tall and short pea
plants can be represented by distinct causal nets B1,B2,B3 that belong to
one common credal net B1. Each of these causal nets is a model of
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classical genetics and explains the data (phenotypic distributions) at hand.
In what follows, I will show how crosses on other characters in Pisum or
with other genera can be represented by causal nets that fit in analogous
credal nets, and explicate the precise relations between these credal nets.
(This will prove to be fruitful when we turn to the discussion of
explanatory unification.)
10 Monohybrid Crosses with Complete Dominance
B1’s can be used to describe monohybrid crosses with tall (dominant) and
short (recessive) Pisum plants. In the history of classical genetics, many
other monohybrid crosses with complete dominance have been reported. In
his Versuche u¨ber Pflanzen-Hybriden, Mendel discussed six more such
crosses with Pisum (Mendel [1865], pp. 5–17). He selected traits relating
to the shape of the ripe seeds (round, wrinkled), the colouration of the
seed albumen (yellow, green), . . . Likewise, Morgan ([1928], pp. 4–5)
discusses the inheritance of eye colour in humans (blue, brown) as an
example of complete dominance. These crosses cannot be described by the
members of B1, since the set of variables V 1 on which these are defined is
tied to stem length in Pisum. However, by slightly changing the members
in V 1, they can.
Consider Morgan’s case of human eye colour. Two phenotypic traits
are studied, where brown is dominant to blue. These are referable to
paired alleles in the germinal material, which Morgan denotes by br and bl
respectively. (Morgan and his co-workers used a large variety of symbolic
systems to denote alleles.) The results of crosses with blue and brown eyes
in humans can be accounted for with the help of the explanatory principles
discussed in section 8.3, viz. the law of segregation, complete dominance,
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etc. Thus, they are very similar to the case of stem length in Pisum. This
similarity can be explicated in a precise way. There is a credal net, say B2,
that is both value-isomorphic and distribution-identical to B1, such that
its members can be used to explain crosses on eye colour in humans.
Let us see how B2 can be characterized. V 2 = {PT ′1, . . . , . . . , GC ′3} is
a set of variables corresponding to the nodes in figure 1, where
[PT ′i ] = {brown, blue}, [GT ′i ] = {brbr, brbl, blbl}, and
[GC ′i] = {br, bl}, (1 ≤ i ≤ 3). Let b : V 1 → V 2 be a bijection such that
b(PTi) = PT
′
i , b(GTi) = GT
′
i , b(GCi) = GC
′
i (1 ≤ i ≤ 3). Let
b′ : [[V 1]]→ [[V 2]] be a bijection such that for any A ∈ V 1 and a ∈ [[V 1]],
a ∈ [A] if and only if b′(a) ∈ [b(A)]. More specifically, let
b′(tall) = brown, b′(short) = blue, b′(tt) = brbr, . . . , b′(s) = bl. V 2 is
value-isomorphic to V 1 (definition 2); hence G2 = 〈V 2, E〉 is
value-isomorphic to G1 = 〈V 1, E〉 (definition 3).
Let P2 be the set of probability distributions over V 2 that satisfy
constraints analogous to tables 1–3 and are causally Markov to G2. More
specifically, where the members of P1 satisfy P (a | pa(A)) = r (for some
r ∈ [0, 1]), let the members of P2 satisfy P (b′(a) | b′(pa(A))) = r for any
A ∈ V 1, a ∈ [A], and pa(A) ∈ [PA(A)].24 (PA(A) ⊂ V 1 comprises A’s
graphic parents in G1.) It follows that P2 is distribution-identical to P1.
Let B2 = 〈G2,P2〉. B2 is value-isomorphic (definition 9) and
distribution-identical (definition 10) to B1. Thus for any possible cross of
tall and short pea plants, there is an analogous cross on eye colour in
humans. And likewise for their respective explanations.
Formally speaking, it is trivially easy to create a distribution-identical
image of a credal net: just relabel the variables and their values. But
empirically, the discovery that eye colour could be explained in the very
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same way as stem length, was not trivial at all. Hence distribution-identity
expresses a philosophically interesting phenomenon (see also section 18).
11 Exemplars, Abstract Explanatory Patterns,
Generic Credal Nets and Mechanism Schemas
The relations between crosses on stem length in pea plants and crosses on
eye colour in humans can be generalized to all monohybrid crosses with
complete dominance. It is useful to introduce the notion of a generic credal
net that serves as an abstract representation of all these similar crosses in
the same way as do Darden’s abstract explanatory patterns. Like abstract
explanatory patterns, generic credal nets are obtained by abstracting from
exemplars and they play a role in a theory’s unifying power.
Darden’s notions of ‘exemplar’ and ‘abstract explanatory pattern’
derive from the works of Kuhn and Kitcher. Starting from (Kuhn [1962],
pp. 186–91), she defines exemplars as ‘[. . . ] concrete problem solutions in
which a formalism (such as a mathematical equation) is applied and given
empirical grounding’ (Darden [1991], p. 18). Kuhnian exemplars, Darden
argues, may serve to generate Kitcherian argument patterns.
[They] may serve in the construction of abstract explanatory
patterns or schemas [. . . ]. The patterns abstractly characterize
mechanisms, which, when they are operating, produce
observable data-points as output. Thus, fitting an observation
into a pattern is a way of explaining it. A set of exemplary
patterns constitutes the explanatory repertoire of Mendelian
genetics [. . . ]. (Darden [1991], p. 19)
The crosses on stem length in Pisum play the role of Dardenian exemplars
in (Morgan [1928]). Darden writes, ‘[t]he examples supplied model cases.
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Similar results of similar hybrid crosses could be explained by invoking
similar steps and filling in the details about the characters in the specific
cross.’ (Darden [1991], p. 18)
Credal nets (such as B1 and B2) can be looked upon as precise
explications of the notion of ‘exemplar’ in Darden’s works. Generic credal
nets can be obtained from credal nets by abstracting from the precise
details (which genotypes?, which phenotypes?, etc.) of the latter. They are
distribution-identical to the credal nets from which they result. Let
Bα = 〈Gα,Pα〉 be a generic credal net that is distribution-identical to B1
(with Gα = 〈V α, E〉). Any reciprocal monohybrid cross with two
phenotypic traits, two alleles, and complete dominance can be described by
means of a causal net that is distribution-identical to some member of Bα,
by filling in V α and Pα.25
These explications of Darden’s concepts are very fruitful, I contend,
because they explicitly make room for causality. This fruitfulness will
emerge in section 18, where I will provide a causal account of explanatory
unification which improves on those of Kitcher and Darden.26
Before we go to the next section, Let me briefly turn to Darden’s more
recent work on mechanisms. Darden now uses the label ‘mechanism
schema’ instead of ‘abstract explanatory pattern’ ([2002], [2005]). A
mechanism schema is a ‘truncated abstract description of a mechanism
that can be instantiated by filling it with more specific descriptions of
component entities and activities’ (Darden [2005], pp. 360–1); see also
(Machamer et al. [2000], p. 15).27 They are often depicted in diagrams
(Darden [2005], p. 358). Darden now claims that ‘[t]he structure of
biological theories in [classical genetics and molecular biology] is best
analyzed by appeal to mechanism schemas, and not by appeal to sets of
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laws or argument schemata’ ([2005], p. 351).
It may be suggested that the notion of ‘mechanism schema’ provides a
more elegant and less formal tool for analysing the theory of classical
genetics than mine.28 Perhaps, my formal apparatus could be eliminated
in favour of the use and reuse with modifications of the diagram in figure
1, interpreted as a mechanism schema. I disagree. Most of Darden’s
mechanism schemas and the diagrams in which they are depicted, are
purely qualitative—as is the graph in figure 1. But in contrast to the
former, the latter may be given a quantitative interpretation in a very
natural way, viz. by combining it with causally Markov probability
distributions so as to obtain causal nets. (Hence generic credal nets offer
an explication of Darden’s mechanism schemas; they should not be
eliminated in favour of the latter.) As should be clear by now, quantitative
information was crucial for the prediction and explanation of phenotypic
distributions in classical genetics. In the interest of prediction, biologists
like Lazebnik ([2002]) and philosophers like Bechtel ([2011]) have stressed
the need for quantitative representations of biologists’ findings at the
expense of merely qualitative, diagrammatic representations. Casini et al.
([2011]) and Clarke et al. ([unpublished]) have offered accounts of
mechanisms invoking causal Bayes nets. These accounts offer an integrated
approach to both the qualitative and the quantitative aspects of
mechanisms. As a result, one of their major advantages is that they can be
easily used for quantitative prediction (both passive prediction and
prediction of the results of manipulations). My approach is in line with
this interesting work.
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12 Incomplete Dominance
B1 and B2 represent but two exemplars, and Bα represents but one part
of classical genetics. Obviously there was more to classical genetics than
monohybrid crosses with complete dominance. After presenting Mendel’s
crosses and those regarding eye colour in man, Morgan turns to crosses
that are interestingly different and which cannot be represented by means
of Bα.
There are other crosses that give, perhaps, a more striking
illustration of Mendel’s first law. For instance, when a red and
a white-flowered four-o’clock [Mirabilis jalapa] are crossed, the
hybrid [F1] has pink flowers [. . . ]. If these pink-flowered hybrid
plants self-fertilize, some of their offspring (F2) are red like one
grandparent, some of them pink like the hybrid, and others
white like the other grandparent, in the ratio of 1:2:1. Here one
original parental color is restored when red germ-cell meets red,
the other color is restored when white meets white, and the
hybrid combinations appear as often as red meets white, or
white meets red. All the colored flowered plants in the second
generation taken together are to the white-flowered plants as
3:1.
In passing it is important to note two facts. The red and the
white F2 individuals are expected to breed true, because they
contain the elements for red, or for white, twice present [. . . ],
but the pink F2 individuals should not breed true, since they
are like the first hybrid generation, and contain one red and
one white element [. . . ]. All this turns out to be true when
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these plants are tested. (Morgan [1928], pp. 5–6)
Morgan’s explanation of these phenotypic distributions rests on the
law of segregation, chance fertilization, and the combination principle.
What is new, however, is the relation between the genotype and the
phenotype. Let me jointly label the relations in the quote above the
‘principle of incomplete dominance’.
How can we account for this difference in terms of causal nets? It is
easily seen that crosses with incomplete dominance are structurally
different from crosses with complete dominance. Crosses on flower colour
in four-o’clocks cannot be described by means of causal nets that are
value-isomorphic (let alone distribution-identical) to members of Bα, since
the corresponding set of variables, say V 3, is not value-isomorphic to V α.
The flower colour of four-o’clocks has three possible states: white, pink,
and red. So let me define V 3 = {PT1, . . . , . . . , GC3}, with
[PTi] = {red, pink, white}, [GTi] = {rr, rw,ww}, and
[GCi] = {r, w}, (1 ≤ i ≤ 3).29 Let G3 = 〈V 3, E〉 be isomorphic to figure 1.
What about the probability distributions over G3? The constraints
generated by incomplete dominance, by Mendel’s first law, and by the
combination principle are summarized in tables 4, 5 and 6, respectively.
Together, they determine the credal set P3(V 3) and the resulting credal
net B3 = 〈G3,P3〉. (As before, chance fertilization is ingrained in the
graphical structure of figure 1.)
In line with section 9, the crosses cited by Morgan can be explained
by means of members of B3. In a first cross, a red flowered four-o’clock is
joined with a white-flowered four-o’clock. Morgan does not clarify which of
the two is the pollen producing plant but, as reciprocal crosses again give
the same results, we may assume that the pollen producing plant is red.30
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table 4 table 5 table 6
PTi GCi GT3
GTi red pink white GTi r w GC1 GC2 rr rw ww
rr 1.00 0.00 0.00 rr 1.00 0.00 r r 1.00 0.00 0.00
rw 0.00 1.00 0.00 rw 0.50 0.50 r w 0.00 1.00 0.00
ww 0.00 0.00 1.00 ww 0.00 1.00 w r 0.00 1.00 0.00
w w 0.00 0.00 1.00
Conditional probability tables 4–6, satisfied by all P ∈ P3
Now consider a distribution P 1(V 3) such that
P 1(PT1 = red) = P
1(PT2 = white) = 1.00.
31 If P 1(V 3) ∈ P3, then
P 1(PT3 = pink) = 1.00. This corresponds to the data, so it may be
assumed that B1 = 〈G3, P 1〉, with P 1 ∈ P3, represents and explains this
first cross. In the second cross, the F1 hybrids are self-fertilized, so let
P 2(V 3) be such that P 2(PT1 = pink) = P
2(PT2 = pink) = 1.00. If
P 2(V 3) ∈ P3, then P 2(PT3 = red) = 0.25, P 2(PT3 = pink) =
0.50, and P 2(PT3 = white) = 0.25. Hence, the 1:2:1 ratio can be
explained by assuming that this cross is rightly described by
B2 = 〈G3, P 2〉, where P 2 ∈ P3.
As we saw in section 9, Morgan cites test crosses to confirm the law of
segregation. With respect to incomplete dominance, he considers three
such crosses: self-fertilization of the red F2 plants, selfing of the white F2
plants, and selfing of the pink F2 hybrids (Morgan [1928], p. 6). All
predictions turned out to be true. In other words, for all three crosses
there is a P ∈ P3 such that the corresponding B = 〈G3, P 〉 explains the
data. As a result, the adequacy of P3 and of B3 is confirmed.
Flower colour in four-o’clocks is not the only character that shows
incomplete dominance. Like results have been obtained with snapdragons
(Antirrhinum), where crosses of red- and white-flowered plants give rise to
pink-flowered offspring (Klug et al. [2006], pp. 68–9).
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These relations can be generalized to all monohybrid crosses with
incomplete dominance. Let Bβ = 〈Gβ,Pβ〉, with Gβ = 〈V β, E〉, be a
generic credal net such that V β is value-isomorphic to V 3, Gβ is
value-isomorphic to G3, and Bβ is distribution-identical to B3. Any
monohybrid cross with incomplete dominance can be described by means
of a causal net that is distribution-identical to some member of Bβ.32
Complete dominance and incomplete dominance are clearly different, as
Bα and Bβ are not value-isomorphic, let alone distribution-identical.
13 Anomalies
The history of classical genetics is replete with theory changes to account
for apparent anomalies. In the beginning of the 20th century, more and
more exceptions to the principle of complete dominance were reported. In
Darden’s terminology, these should be regarded as model anomalies (as
opposed to monster anomalies), since they required ‘a change in the set of
patterns for normal, well-functioning cases. [. . . ] either the alteration of a
typical pattern or the addition of one or more new patterns to the set’
(Darden [1991], p. 199).33 Mendel’s theory was not abandoned, but
adapted.34
In the structuralist vocabulary: crosses with complete dominance and
with incomplete dominance are different kinds of intended applications,
giving rise to different kinds of data structures, which are to be dealt with
by means of different theory-elements (Balzer and Lorenzano [2000], pp.
256–61).
In my terminology: failures of complete dominance gave rise to data
for which there is no B = 〈G,P 〉 such that (i) B is distribution-identical to
some member of Bα, the then available generic credal net, and such that
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(ii) P is consistent with the data. They were model anomalies since they
required a new generic credal net, Bβ = 〈Gβ,Pβ〉, that substantially
differed from Bα.
14 Multihybrid Crosses with Independent Assortment
After presenting two monohybrid crosses with complete dominance, and
one with incomplete dominance, Morgan turns to dihybrid crosses. He
cites one of Mendel’s well-known dihybrid crosses with Pisum plants on
albumen colour (yellow versus green) and seed shape (round versus
wrinkled).35 Mendel had first crossed peas with yellow and round seeds
and peas with green and wrinkled seeds. The resulting hybrids (F1) were
yellow and round. Then he self-fertilized the hybrids, thus obtaining F2
plants which were yellow round, yellow wrinkled, green round, and green
wrinkled in the ratio of 9:3:3:1. (Morgan [1928], pp. 7–8)
To explain the phenotypic distributions in the F1 and the F2
generation, Morgan takes the law of segregation and adds the assumption
that segregation for one pair of elements is independent of segregation for
another pair. This is the law of independent assortment (Morgan [1928], p.
10). He assumes complete dominance for the pairs yellow/green and
round/wrinkled, as in the monohybrid crosses. He adopts some revised
version of the combination principle (see figure 8 in Morgan [1928], p. 9).
Finally, he assumes chance fertilization. Together, these laws or
explanatory principles give rise to a credal net, say B4 = 〈G4,P4〉, the
members of which explain dihybrid crosses on albumen colour and seed
shape in pea plants. Let us see how B4 looks like.
Clearly, the above crosses cannot be described by any set of variables
that is value-isomorphic to V α or V β. Each phenotypic variable has four
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possible values: [PTi] = {yellowround, yellowwrinkled, greenround,
greenwrinkled}. Morgan refers these phenotypes to eight possible
genotypes: [GTi] = {GGWW,GGWw, . . . , ggww}; see table 7 for the full
list. The gametes have four possible make-ups: [GCi] = {GW,Gw, gW,
gw}.36 (G stands for the yellow-producing allele, g for green, W for round,
w for wrinkled.) Let V 4 be the set of these variables and let G4 = 〈V 4, E〉
be isomorphic to figure 1.
Tables 7 and 8 specify some of the constraints to be satisfied by all P
in the credal set P4 over V 4. (I will not discuss the combination principle,
the specification of which is straightforward. Nor will I discuss chance
fertilization, which is ingrained in figure 1.) Table 7 explicates the principle
of complete dominance for both albumen colour and seed shape. Table 8
explicates the law of segregation and the law of independent assortment.
The fifth line of table 8 shows the quintessence of independent assortment:
P (GCi = GW | GTi = GgWw) = P (GCi = Gw | GTi = GgWw) =
P (GCi = gW | GTi = GgWw) = P (GCi = gw | GTi = GgWw) = 14
(compare this with the fifth line of table 10).
Both aforecited crosses (GGWW × ggww and GgWw ×GgWw) can
be explained by means of a causal net B ∈ B4. Similar crosses can be
explained in a similar way. Hence, let Bγ = 〈Gγ ,Pγ〉 be the generic credal
net for dihybrid crosses with complete dominance and independent
assortment, where Gγ = 〈V γ , E〉 and where Bγ is distribution-identical to
B4.
15 Multihybrid Crosses with Linkage and Crossing-over
Many cases of independent assortment were known at the time, yet
independent assortment is not a universally applicable law.
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table 7 table 8
PTi GCi
ye ye gr gr
GTi rnd wrd rnd wrd GTi GW Gw gW gw
GGWW 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 GGWW 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
GGWw 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 GGWw 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00
GGww 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 GGww 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
GgWW 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 GgWW 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00
GgWw 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 GgWw 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Ggww 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 Ggww 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.50
ggWW 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 ggWW 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
ggWw 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 ggWw 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.50
ggww 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 ggww 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Conditional probability tables 7–8, to be satisfied by all P ∈ P4 (together
with the combination principle)
It might, then, have seemed justifiable to extend this
conclusion to as many pairs of characters as enter any
particular cross. This would mean that there are as many
independent pairs of elements in the germinal material as there
are possible characters. Subsequent work has shown, however,
that Mendel’s second law of independent assortment has a
more restricted application, since many pairs of elements do
not assort freely, but certain elements that enter together show
a tendency to remain together in succeeding generations. This
is called linkage. (Morgan [1928], p. 10)
More precisely,
By linkage we mean that when certain characters enter a cross
together, they tend to remain together in later generations, or,
stated in a negative way, certain pairs of characters do not
assort at random. (Morgan [1928], p. 10)
Genes that are linked belong to the same linkage group. Drosophila
melanogaster (fruit fly), for example, has four linkage groups (Morgan
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[1928], pp. 11–2). It was soon discovered that genes in the same linkage
group are not always completely linked. There may be some interchange
between linkage groups.
This interchange is called crossing-over, which means that,
between two corresponding linked series, there may take place
an orderly interchange involving great numbers of genes.
(Morgan [1928], p. 14)
As an exemplar, Morgan cites crosses performed by Bateson and
Punnett on Lathyrus odoratus or sweet peas (purple flowers and long
pollen grains crossed to red flowers and round pollen grains). Flower colour
and pollen shape in sweet peas were known to show normal Mendelian
segregation and to satisfy the principle of complete dominance, with purple
dominant to red and long dominant to round (Darden [1991], pp. 122–3).
Bateson and Punnett had observed that ‘the two types that go in together
come out together more frequently than expected for independent
assortment of purple-red and round-long’ (Morgan [1928], p. 10).
Because of the difference between linkage and independent
assortment, there is no credal net B which is (i) distribution-identical to
Bγ , the generic credal net for dihybrid crosses with independent
assortment, and which is such that (ii) its members can be used to explain
dihybrid crosses on flower colour and pollen shape in sweet peas. We
should seek a new credal net, say B5 = 〈G5,P5〉, with G5 = 〈V 5, E〉 and
such that P5 accounts for the failure of independent assortment.
Let us first have a look at Bateson and Punnett’s data (Morgan
[1928], p. 11, figure 9).37 Cross 1: Sweet peas with purple flowers and long
pollen grains were crossed with sweet peas with red flowers and round
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pollen grains. (It may be assumed that all plants were true-breeding.) The
resulting hybrids (F1) had long pollen grains and purple flowers. Cross 2:
Self-fertilization of the F1 generation produced F2 individuals in the
following proportions (the absolute frequencies are Morgan’s, I have added
the percentages):
cross 2: long, purple round, purple long, red round, red
583 26 24 170
73% 3% 3% 21%
These results can be explained as follows. We know that the F1 plants
are hybrid, so P (GT1 = GgWw) = P (GT2 = GgWw) = 1.00, where G
denotes the purple-producing allele, g the red-producing allele, W the
long-producing allele and w the round-producing allele.38 We may assume
that complete dominance still holds between purple and red, and between
long and round in the dihybrid case, so that we may rely on some variant
of table 7. We may also assume that the combination principle holds.
Then all we need to do is to find the appropriate conditional probability
table for the relation between GTi and GCi. It turns out that the
phenotypic distribution for the F2 individuals can be explained if (but not
only if, see below)
P (GCi = GW | GTi = GgWw) = 0.46
P (GCi = Gw | GTi = GgWw) = 0.04
P (GCi = gW | GTi = GgWw) = 0.04
P (GCi = gw | GTi = GgWw) = 0.46
For example, by the principle of complete dominance the F2
individuals can only have round pollen and red flowers if their genotype is
ggww. Hence their fertilizing gametes must both be gw. The following
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calculations retrodict that 21% of the F2 plants will have round pollen and
red flowers (assuming chance fertilization). We know that
P (GT1 = GgWw) = P (GT2 = GgWw) = 1.00. By the conditional
probabilities just given, we can compute that P (GC1 = gw) = 0.46, and
likewise that P (GC2 = gw) = 0.46. Given chance fertilization,
P (GC1 = gw ∧GC2 = gw) = 0.46× 0.46 = 0.21. So by the combination
principle and by some analogue of table 7, P (GT3 = ggww) = 0.21 and
P (PT3 = roundred) = 0.21. Like calculations allow to retrodict the
probabilities of the other phenotypes in F2.
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P5 cannot be specified by demanding that for all P ∈ P5 the above
conditional probabilities hold, since these conditional probabilities are
cross-dependent. Assume that, in cross 1, GGww individuals had been
crossed with ggWW individuals (instead of GGWW × ggww).40 The
resulting F1 hybrids would all be GgWw, as in Morgan’s example. But
self-fertilization of these hybrids would give F2 plants in the following
proportions:
long, purple round, purple long, red round, red
50,16% 24,84% 24.84% 0.16%
The reason is that here G and w (and thus g and W ), tend to remain
together, whereas in the original cross G and W (and thus g and w) did so:
P (GCi = GW | GTi = GgWw) = 0.04
P (GCi = Gw | GTi = GgWw) = 0.46
P (GCi = gW | GTi = GgWw) = 0.46
P (GCi = gw | GTi = GgWw) = 0.04
How, then, should we characterize P5? Linkage and crossing-over
influence the probabilistic relations between GTi and GCi, as compared to
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table 9 table 10
PTi GCi
pu pu red red
GTi lng rnd lng rnd GTi GW Gw gW gw
GGWW 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 GGWW 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
GGWw 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 GGWw 0.50 0.50 0.00 0.00
GGww 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 GGww 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00
GgWW 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 GgWW 0.50 0.00 0.50 0.00
GgWw 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 GgWw a
2
1−a
2
1−a
2
a
2
a ∈ {0.08, 0.92}
Ggww 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 Ggww 0.00 0.50 0.00 0.50
ggWW 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 ggWW 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00
ggWw 0.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 ggWw 0.00 0.00 0.50 0.50
ggww 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 ggww 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00
Conditional probability tables 9–10, satisfied by all P ∈ P5 (together with
the combination principle). Table 9 is analogous to table 7 (complete
dominance holds, even though pollen shape is linked with flower colour).
The difference between tables 8 and 10 reveals the difference between
independent assortment on the one hand, and linkage and crossing-over on
the other hand. min{0.08, 0.92} is the frequency of crossing-over.
cases of independent assortment, if and only if GTi = GgWw (i.e., if and
only if doubly heterozygous plants are involved).41 Both sets of conditional
probabilities listed above can be summarized as follows:
P (GCi = GW | GTi = GgWw) = a
2
P (GCi = Gw | GTi = GgWw) = 1− a
2
P (GCi = gW | GTi = GgWw) = 1− a
2
P (GCi = gw | GTi = GgWw) = a
2
,
where a ∈ {0.08, 0.92} and where min{0.08, 0.92} = 0.08 is the frequency of
crossing-over for dihybrid crosses on flower colour and pollen shape in
Lathyrus odoratus. All this is summarized in table 10.
P5 thus is the set of distributions over V 5 that satisfy tables 9 and 10
(plus the combination principle and chance fertilization). (Note that the
physical probability a may take two possible values and that hence the
distribution over GCi conditional on GTi is imprecise. But regarding
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crosses on flower colour and pollen shape in Lathyrus odoratus, the
physical probability a may not take a value between 0.08 and 0.92.)
Other crosses, for example on Drosophila, also revealed linkage and
crossing-over, but with different frequencies of crossing-over. The
frequency of crossing-over for some particular pair of genes in some
particular organism is most easily determined observationally as follows
(cf. Morgan [1928], pp. 14–7). Let A and B denote dominant alleles; a and
b their recessive counterparts. Let two grandparental individuals (e.g.
AABB and aabb, or AAbb and aaBB) together produce a double
heterozygote (AaBb) (F1). Perform the cross AaBb× aabb (the resulting
offspring is F2). Barring problems of statistical inference and barring cases
of double crossing-over, the frequency of crossing-over is identical to the
proportion of individuals in F2 that do not phenotypically resemble any of
the grandparents (called cross-over types).
Crosses on wing colour (yellow, gray) and eye colour (white, red) in
Drosophila revealed a frequency of crossing-over of 1%. Other crosses in
Drosophila gave other frequencies: 33% in white versus red eyes and
miniature versus long wings, or 40% in white versus red eyes and forked
versus normal bristles. If there are no cross-over types, linkage is complete.
In short, Morgan and his group observed all possible percentages of
crossing-over, up to nearly 50% (Morgan [1928], pp. 19–20). As a result,
the generic credal net for dihybrid crosses with linkage and crossing-over
(and with complete dominance) should look like the following. Let
Bδ = 〈Gδ,Pδ〉 be such that (i) Gδ = 〈V δ, E〉 is value-isomorphic to
G5 = 〈V 5, E〉, and (ii) any P ∈ Pδ satisfies complete dominance, the
combination principle and some analogue of table 10, where a ∈ {b, 1− b}
for some b ∈ [0.00, 0.50]. (It should be noted that the characterization of
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Pδ should invoke one more principle relating to the linear ordering of the
genes, see section 16.)
16 Double Crossing-over and the Linear Order of the Gene
Crossing-over may occur within linkage groups and the frequency of
crossing-over may be estimated from the types of crosses cited in section
15. However, the Morgan group discovered a phenomenon called double
crossing-over that leads to a systematic underrating of the frequencies of
crossing-over. ‘By double crossing-over is meant that interchange takes
place twice between two pairs of genes involved in the cross. The result is
to lower the observed cases of crossing-over, since a second crossing-over
undoes the effect of a single crossing-over’ (Morgan [1928], p. 20, original
emphasis). This problem is solved by taking into account more than two
pairs of traits.
For example, if a female [Drosophila] with the following nine
characters of Group I, scute, echinus, cross-veinless, cut, tan,
vermilion, garnet, forked and bobbed, is crossed to a wild type
male, and if the F1 female [. . . ] is back-crossed to the same
multiple recessive type, the offspring produced will give a
record of every crossing-over. (Morgan [1928], p. 20)
Based on these results, Morgan draws a linear diagram depicting the
corresponding genes in the linkage group ([1928], p. 21). In figure 2,
crossing-over has taken place twice. As a result, it seems as if no
crossing-over has taken place between e.g. forked and cross-veinless, thus
lowering the estimated frequency of crossing-over. By taking the
intermediate loci into account, this bias is remedied.
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Figure 2: The linear order of the genes in Group I of Drosophila (adapted
from Morgan [1928], p. 21, figures 15 and 18). At the top, no crossing-over
has occurred. At the bottom, crossing-over took place twice (between tan
and cut, and between garnet and forked).
More generally, the Morgan group concluded that linkage groups can
be represented linearly, with genes lying in a line ‘like beads on a string’
(Morgan [1928], p. 24). Evidence for this linear order came from two
sources. First, cytological evidence showed that chromosomes were
threadlike entities (Morgan [1928], pp. 38–44). As the assumption that
genes are located on the chromosomes became more and more accepted, it
was most natural to assume they are organized linearly. Second, genetic
evidence pointed in the same direction in a way that is relevant for the
characterization of Pδ.
It can be assumed that crossing-over is the result of some interchange
taking place at the level of the chromosomes (Morgan [1928], p. 39).
Though cytological evidence for such an interchange was not conclusive, it
was quite convincing (Morgan [1928], p. 44). Such considerations gave rise
to the concept of map distance: the ‘distance’ between pairs of elements or
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genes on the same chromosome, measured in terms of their percentage of
crossing-over (Morgan [1928], p. 22).42 The concept of map distance
allowed to further corroborate the hypothesis of the linear order of the
genes.
Suppose that crossing-over between yellow wings and white
eyes occurs in 1.2 per cent of cases. If we then test white with a
third member of the same series, such as bifid wings, we find
3.5 per cent of crossing-over [. . . ]. If bifid is in line and on one
side of white it is expected to give with yellow 4.7 per cent
crossing-over, if on the other side of white it is expected to give
2.3 per cent of crossing-over with yellow. In fact, it gives one of
these values, namely, 4.7. We place it, therefore, below white in
the diagram. This sort of result is obtained whenever a new
character is compared with two other members of the same
linkage group. The crossing-over of a new character is found to
give, in relation to two other known factors, either the sum or
the difference of their respective cross-over values. This is the
known relation of points on a line, and is the proof of the linear
order of the genes; for no other spatial relation has yet been
found that fulfills these conditions. (Morgan [1928], p. 24, my
emphasis)
Morgan’s citation can be explicated as follows. Let i, j and k be
characters of the same kind of organism, say Drosophila. Let the credal net
Bij = 〈〈V ij , E〉,Pij〉 be the set of causal nets that represent dihybrid
crosses on i and j (and analogously for Bjk = 〈〈V jk, E〉,Pjk〉 and
Bik = 〈〈V ik, E〉,Pik〉). If i, j and k are cases of complete dominance, then
Bij , Bjk and Bik are distribution-identical to Bδ.43 Finally, let
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aij , ajk, and aik be the frequencies of crossing-over for Bij ,Bjk and Bik.
If the genes belong to the same linkage group, then according to Morgan’s
findings either aij = ajk + aik or aij = |ajk − aik|. This imposes an
important constraint (in the structuralists’ sense) on the characterization
of Pδ: it expresses important connections between different local
applications of Bδ.
17 Causal-Structural Explanation
Let us turn now to the final part of this paper: the causal-structural
account of explanation and its relation to unification. As we saw in
sections 9-16, Morgan explains filial phenotypic distributions by means of a
carefully chosen set of explanatory principles or laws and assumptions
regarding the parental genotypes. As such, his explanations are a syntactic
enterprise, a matter of derivation. But they can also be explicated
model-theoretically. To explain a given phenotypic distribution, one tries
to find an appropriate credal net B, satisfying the right explanatory
principles, so that one of its causal nets can be used to embed the data in.
The label ‘causal-structural account of explanation’ covers both these
aspects of explanation.
This account has a number of interesting characteristics. First and
foremost, it is a causal account of explanation. The laws or explanatory
principles invoked by Morgan are inextricably joined to the causal
structure in figure 1, where this structure is defined in terms of
Woodward’s (DC).
It may seem strange to equate the explanatory principles of classical
genetics with laws. After all, aren’t laws of nature true, universal and
physically necessary generalizations whereas the explanatory principles of
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classical genetics face numerous exceptions, have a limited domain of
application and are highly contingent? No. By endorsing this claim, one
would demand too much from laws of nature—in fact so much that it
becomes questionable whether there are any laws at all in the special
sciences. As I have argued following Mitchell ([1997], [2000]), explanatory
principles such as those of classical genetics, need not satisfy the
traditional criteria for lawfulness to deserve the label ‘law’ (Leuridan
[2010]). If they (or, more precisely, the regularities they describe) have
sufficient stability and strength,44 and if they are invariant under some
range of interventions, they can be used (in particular contexts) for
explanation (even if they fail to hold outside those contexts). The
causal-structural account of scientific theories provides a nice explication of
this view. The explanatory principles or laws of each (generic) credal net
have a limited domain of application. Within that domain, they may be
used for explanation regardless of the fact that they face exceptions
(anomalies, see section 13) and fail to hold in other credal nets.
Another way to phrase this is as follows. Each generic credal net
implicitly incorporates a set of ceteris paribus conditions which help to
determine its domain of intended applications. Of course, these are not
just any ceteris paribus conditions, but well delineated sets of such
conditions, based on existing scientific knowledge. So it should not be
feared that these ceteris paribus conditions make the principles of classical
genetics trivially true. (See Pietroski and Rey [1995]; Earman et al. [2002];
Woodward [2002]; and Mitchell [2002] for a discussion of ceteris paribus
clauses.) For example, Bα −Bδ all assume that mutation does not occur;
and Bγ and Bδ both assume that there is no gene interaction.
A second characteristic of the causal-structural account of explanation
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is that it also is an epistemic and representational, rather than an ontic
account of explanation. What explains is not the causal structure of the
world itself, but causal explanatory principles describing that causal
structure. The model-theoretic approach need not detract from that
representational character, as classical genetics’ causal nets are themselves
‘simulacra’ of real-world states of affairs (cf. Cartwright [1983], pp.
143–62).45 To say it with a catchword: ‘No explanation without
representation!’ Yet focussing on these models also helps to see that
explanation is not merely derivational ; the causal nets in question have to
bear the right relations to the ontic structure of the world. And it helps to
illuminate the notion of explanatory unification; the causal nets in
question bear interesting similarity relations to each other. Finally, the
formal framework I use allows for an integrated approach to both the
qualitative and the quantitative aspects of causal structures in a way that
is suitable for e.g. prediction (see section 11).
18 Explanatory Unification
The causal-structural account of scientific theories allows us to get a grip
on explanatory unification within a causalist framework. Today, Kitcher’s
anti-causalist approach is still influential in the literature on unification.
Yet in the past years, the need for, or desirability of, a causalist account
has been stressed by several authors. Here, I will present the criticisms
raised by Ma¨ki ([2001]) and Woodward ([2003]) against Kitcher’s
unificationism, elaborate my own proposal, and contrast it with Strevens’
kairetic account.
Kitcherian unification consists in showing that many different
phenomena can be derived from a small number of explanatory patterns.
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The unifying power of a set of argument patterns varies directly with the
number of statements that can be derived by means of its members,
directly with the stringency of the patterns in the set,46 and inversely with
the number of patterns in the set (Kitcher [1989], p. 435). The patterns in
the most unifying set of patterns over a body of scientific knowledge K
(called the explanatory store E(K)) determine what explains what.
Both Ma¨ki and Woodward endorse the importance of unification as an
epistemic virtue, but they are dissatisfied by Kitcher’s approach. I go with
them in several ways. I, too, consider unificatory power an epistemic
virtue. It is a virtue which scientific theories may have to a greater or
lesser extent on top of their being explanatory. I also agree with their
critique of Kitcher. Yet I am not fully satisfied with their views either (for
reasons to be outlined below). As I will show, the causal-structural theory
of explanation adequately addresses their worries while providing an
interesting and elaborate alternative to Kitcher’s account.
Woodward finds the idea that explanation is a matter of unifying a
range of different phenomena ‘unquestionably intuitively appealing’;
generality is ‘at least sometimes an explanatory virtue’; and ‘theory
unification has clearly played an important role in science’ ([2003], p. 358).
Yet he wonders whether our intuitive notion(s) of unification can be made
more precise in a way that fits our interventionist intuitions concerning
explanation ([2003], p. 358). In his opinion, Kitcher fails to do so.
Unification may be an explanatory virtue, but it is not a sufficient
condition for explanation: ‘considerations having to do with unification do
not automatically pick out those derivations that are explanatory from
those that are not’ ([2003], p. 361).
Woodward’s own proposal is to explicate unification in terms of ranges
58
of invariance. A generalization’s explanatory depth is tied to the range of
ideal interventions under which it is invariant: the wider its range of
invariance, the more explanatory it is ([2003], pp. 257–65). This range of
invariance is also related to the generalization’s generality or unifying
power ([2003], pp. 366 and 373).
I agree that ‘range of invariance’ captures part of the notion of
unification, but I think that more of Kitcher’s intuitions can be recovered
in the interventionist approach (note that Woodward leaves open this
possibility; [2003], p. 373). More specifically, generic credal nets and their
possible interrelations allow us to explicate the intuition that different
phenomena can be explained by means of a number of more or less similar
causal ‘patterns’. But let me first turn to Ma¨ki’s views.
For Ma¨ki, Kitcher’s account of unification is problematic as it comes
down to mere derivational unification, i.e. ‘unification as a derivational
accomplishment without ontological groundings’ ([2001], p. 497).
According to Kitcher, explanation is not a matter of describing causal
relations in the world. Instead, causal relevance is dependent on
explanatory relevance and hence on derivational unification ([1989], pp.
436 and 499; see also section 4 above.
In Ma¨ki’s opinion, unification should not be (merely) derivational; it
should (also) be ontological.47 Ontological unification is ‘based on the
referential and representational capabilities of theories’, not on their
inferential capabilities (Ma¨ki [2001], p. 498).48 It is ‘a matter of
redescribing apparently independent and diverse phenomena as
manifestations [. . . ] of one and the same small number of entities, powers,
and processes’ (Ma¨ki [2001], p. 498).
Unification, according to this picture, is not just a matter of
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derivational success but rather a matter of successfully
representing how things are related in the causal order of things
in the world. (Ma¨ki [2001], p. 500, my emphasis)
What is important for the present paper, is the fact that derivational and
ontological unification need not be incompatible (Ma¨ki [2001], p. 499).
They may coincide, or derivational unification may have partial ontological
grounds. Ontological unification is only incompatible with mere
derivational unification. I agree that ontological and derivational
unification may coincide. But Ma¨ki’s view is only partly satisfying, as he
adds the following:
My hunch is that this is a contingent issue; there is no necessity
for the two kinds of unification to be related in one particular
way or another. (Ma¨ki [2001], p. 499)
Ma¨ki’s hunch is plausible, provided derivation is tied to standard logical
inference. In this respect I would like to take his side. Kitcher’s argument
patterns are phrased in natural language, but their expressive power does
not exceed that of non-modal second order logic joined with probability
theory.49 Hence, whether they coincide with ‘the causal order of things in
the world’ (where this causal order is not defined as a function of the
explanatory relations), is a contingent issue. Yet if derivation is tied to
causal reasoning, the tie between derivational and ontological unification is
much stronger and Ma¨ki’s distinction largely dissolves. In this sense, his
answer is but partly satisfying.
In my causal-structural framework, unification is a matter of
similarity between a theory’s intended applications and, relatedly, between
its causal and credal nets. As such, it comes in degrees. The stronger the
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relations between credal nets (where distribution-identity is stronger than
value-isomorphism, which is stronger than isomorphism), the stronger the
corresponding phenomena are unified. But, and this is very important, all
credal nets are isomorphic.
First, different crosses on a particular trait (or set of traits) in a
particular organism are explained by means of a given set of explanatory
principles. For example, crosses on stem length in pea plants are explained
by means of complete dominance, the law of segregation, chance
fertilization, and the combination principle. Semantically speaking, these
different crosses are embedded in different causal nets B1,B2, . . . which
belong to a common credal net B1. This already provides some unification.
Second, other crosses, e.g. on eye colour in humans, are explained by
means of the very same explanatory principles. They are embedded in
causal nets that belong to a different credal net, such as B2. B2 is
distribution-identical to B1, which means that inheritance of stem length
in pea plants and of eye colour in humans is highly similar,
notwithstanding the fact that prima facie they are very distinct characters
in very distinct species. This can be generalized to all monohybrid crosses
with complete dominance. These can be explained by members of credal
nets that are distribution-identical to B1. I have used the generic credal
net Bα as an abstract representation of all such crosses. Many divergent
cases can be viewed as highly similar (in the sense of distribution-identity).
Distribution-identity is a very strong notion of similarity which expresses a
kind of very strong unification. It shows that phenomena not only
resemble each other qualitatively (qua qualitative causal relations), but
also quantitatively or probabilistically.
Third, monohybrid crosses with complete dominance are but one kind
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or type of phenomena. Other kinds were explained by means of other sets
of explanatory principles, giving rise to other generic credal nets. (Each of
these generic credal nets, and their instances, provide unification for their
domain of intended application.) I have discussed Bβ,Bγ ,Bδ, and more
could be specified for other types of crosses (see section 19). All these
credal nets (and their specific instances) are isomorphic, as their graphs
are isomorphic to figure 1. Isomorphism is a much weaker relation than
distribution-identity, and hence expresses a weaker notion of unification,
but the large number of kinds of phenomena that stand in this
isomorphism relation made classical genetics interestingly unifying. And
what is important: it shows that all these kinds of crosses are explained in
terms of a common underlying causal structure, and that the distinct
generic credal nets of classical genetics each characterize very similar
mechanisms50 (Darden [1991], p. 19) or very similar entities, powers and
processes (Ma¨ki [2001], p. 498).
The causal-structural notion of unification is both derivational and
ontological and hence meets Ma¨ki’s worries. It is derivational because
classical genetics makes use of (a limited stock of) explanatory principles,
which are syntactic statements, to explain a wide range of phenomena. It
is also ontological, because these principles are closely tied to a common
causal mechanism (entities, processes, powers) which is qualitatively
represented in figure 1.51
All of classical genetics’ causal nets are isomorphic, and this shows
that apparently very different phenomena can be explained in a unified
way. Yet I do not claim that isomorphism of a theory’s causal nets is a
sufficient condition for that theory to be unifying. One may, after all,
devise artifacts that have a causal structure that is isomorphic to figure 1
62
but which have nothing to do with classical genetics. To show that their
structure is isomorphic to the causal nets of classical genetics would only
be a kind of ‘spurious unification’ (Kitcher [1981], pp. 526–9). The
phenomena to be explained have to be in the domain of intended
applications of classical genetics. This is not a defect of my account, but
an unavoidable feature that it shares with the structuralists and with
Kitcher. From their works it is clear that there is no straightforward
recipe, or set of necessary and sufficient conditions, for establishing a
theory’s domain of intended applications. As I wrote in section 3.1, the
structuralist notion of intended applications cannot be defined in a purely
formal way; it also relies on pragmatic considerations—see (Balzer et al.
[1987], pp. 37–40, 87–9; Balzer and Lorenzano [2000], p. 245; Balzer and
Dawe [1986a], p. 67). Sets of intended applications I are often specified by
citing a few ‘paradigms’ or ‘exemplars’ such as stem length in pea plants.
All exemplars of classical genetics concern crosses of organisms with
certain phenotypic traits, the resulting progeny of which shows a more or
less definite phenotypic distribution. To be included in the set of intended
applications of classical genetics, crosses of organisms have to be
sufficiently similar to one of its exemplars (qua types of traits involved, qua
resulting distributions, etc.).52 What counts as sufficiently similar depends
on pragmatic considerations. Moreover, the set of classical genetics’
intended applications changed over time and frequently was a matter of
debate (Darden [1991], pp. 166 and 260). Likewise, Kitcher’s notion of
filling instructions, which he needs to avoid spurious unification, cannot be
formally defined. Although he nowhere says so, it is clear from his writings
that their specification has to rely on pragmatic considerations as well.
Isomorphism is not a necessary condition either. Define isomorphism
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class as a class of causal nets that are isomorphic to each other. While
classical genetics has only one isomorphism class (all of its causal nets are
isomorphic to each other), there may be scientific theories that have more
than one such class and still are judged to have at least some unifying
power. Yet I conjecture that, ceteris paribus, the less isomorphism classes
a theory has, the more we would judge it to be unifying. A theory with
less isomorphism classes posits less fundamentally different causal
structures underlying the phenomena to be explained.53 Thus,
isomorphism for causal and credal nets and its stronger nephew,
distribution-identity, serve to explicate our intuitive notion of unification
in a way that fits the interventionist theory of causation and allows to
reconcile derivational with ontological unification.
Let me conclude this section by briefly turning to Strevens’ kairetic
account of explanation. The claim that the causal-structural account of
scientific theories allows us to get a grip on explanatory unification within
a causalist framework may suggest that this account is similar in spirit to
Strevens’ ([2004]), at least prima facie. After all, Strevens also endeavours
to ‘unify the causal and unificatory approaches to explanation—causally’
(see the title of his paper). More specifically, his goal is ‘a causal account
of explanation that has many of the advantages of the unification account’
(Strevens [2004], p. 154). Yet there are some important differences which
reward further examination. (Strevens [2004] focuses on explanations of
events or singular facts, whereas I have been focusing here on explanations
of regularities, yet the differences I mention carry over to the kairetic
account of the explanation of laws and regularities; see Strevens [2008],
part III.)
A first difference is that Strevens’ use of the unificationist framework
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is not meant to capture the notion of unification, but the distinct notion of
explanatory relevance. A second, minor difference is that Strevens’ use of
‘model’ as a ‘set of propositions’ is a syntactic one ([2004], p. 163), whereas
mine is semantic. This brings me to a last and most important difference.
Strevens does not attempt to explicate his concept of causation. This
places him in a comfortable position—too comfortable, perhaps. It allows
him, for instance, to stipulate that logical entailment in causal models
represents relations of causal production ([2004], p. 163). The literature on
interventionist accounts of causation has shown, however, that one should
not skate on thin ice when trying to make logical entailment fit causal
relations; see e.g. (Hausman [1998], chapter 8) for an elaborate attempt to
model explanations as causal arguments. Strevens ([2004], p. 163)
acknowledges that not all entailments represent causal processes. Yet he
does not provide even the slightest account of what would make an
entailment represent a causal process. The best one finds, is whether or
not physical theory (the true theory of everything, whatever that may be)
attributes to the premises the power to bring about the conclusion ([2004],
p. 165). By opting for a specific and substantive account of causation
(Woodward’s), I have placed myself in a more difficult and vulnerable
situation, since I expose myself to possible counterexamples (see section 19
on the tenability of the Causal Markov Condition).
19 Concluding Remarks
In this final section, I would like to make some concluding remarks on
three issues. First, I will briefly discuss the parts of classical genetics which
I have not explicitly dealt with in this paper. Second, I will consider the
applicability of the causal-structural account to theories other than
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classical genetics. What characteristics should a theory have in order to fit
the causal-structural account? This brings me to a third and very
important issue: the tenability of the Causal Markov Condition.
In this paper, I have discussed some of the best known parts of
classical genetics, starting from Morgan’s exposition from 1928. At the
time, however, many phenomena were known that do not fit any of the
generic credal nets I have sketched: cases of sex-linked inheritance,
multiple alleles, multiple genes, gene interaction, pleiotropy, lethal alleles,
non-diploidy, incomplete penetrance, . . . I contend that causal nets, credal
nets and generic credal nets can be defined for all these phenomena, based
on the graph in figure 1. Hence they fit the causal-structural account of
classical genetics.
Apart from classical genetics, which other theories would be suitable
for the causal-structural account of scientific theories? In my opinion, the
following three criteria are relevant (this list is not intended to be
exhaustive). First, the theory in question should be causal in the
interventionist sense. The concepts of intervention, invariance and the like
should be applicable. Given that Woodward ([2003]) uses examples from a
wide range of scientific disciplines, ranging from physics and chemistry,
over biology and the biomedical sciences, to economics and social theory,
this criterion is not very restrictive. Still, not all scientific theories may be
suitable. For example, it has been suggested that the notion of ‘ideal
intervention’ is not applicable to EPR phenomena in quantum mechanics
(Hausman and Woodward [1999], pp. 560–70). If that is correct, then my
causal-structural account is not suited for quantum mechanics. (See Sua´rez
and San Pedro [2011], pp. 183–7, for a critical evaluation of Hausman and
Woodward’s claim, however.)
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Second, given the relations between the causal-structural account and
Sneedian structuralism, I surmise that a good place to look for further
candidate theories would be among the wide range of examples that have
been discussed by the structuralists (see Balzer et al. [2000], for a
collection of paradigmatic examples). Insofar as these theories fit the
interventionist framework, approaching them from a causal-structural
rather than structuralist perspective would be advantageous. For example,
it would allow us to examine to what extent they give rise to causalist
explanatory unification.
A theory that seems to meet both criteria is general equilibrium
theory in economics, which pictures the economy as ‘a collection of
economic agents who make supply and demand decisions over
commodities, labour types and assets, in order to further their own
interests’ and ‘studies the equilibrium properties of the economy, so
conceived’ (Bryant [2010], p. 1). Hamminga and Balzer ([2000]) have
analysed this theory within the structuralist framework and Woodward
([2003], pp. 233 and 355–6) suggests that the relations between e.g. supply,
demand and prices can be analysed in interventionist terms.
The third criterion is related to the first: the theory should not violate
the Causal Markov Condition (CMC), as that condition is one of the most
central assumptions of my account. The aforementioned claim by
Hausman Woodward ([1999]) is based on problems regarding the CMC in
the context of EPR phenomena.
The CMC and its relation to interventionism are not undisputed.54
Hausman and Woodward ([1999], [2004a], [2004b]) defend the link between
the CMC and manipulation. Cartwright ([2001], [2002]) and Steel ([2006])
offer a critical discussion. It has been also argued that the CMC may fail
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for a number of reasons (see Cartwright [2001], pp. 254–60; Spirtes et al.
[2000], pp. 295–7; and Williamson [2005], pp. 52–7). One example is
Cartwright’s chemical factory ([1999], p. 7). Suppose that a factory C
probabilistically produces some chemical X, and that when it does
produce X, it also produces, as a side-effect, a nasty polluant Y . X and Y
always occur together (the one is produced if and only if the other is). The
factory is a purely probabilistic cause: X (and hence Y ) is produced only
80% of the time the production process is active. In this set-up, X and Y
are not independent conditional on C.55 Hence the CMC is violated.
Different solutions have been proposed for this problem. For example,
Hausman and Woodward ([1999], p. 562) suggest that maybe C has been
characterized in insufficient detail. Another possibility is to treat the
production of the chemical and its by-product as a single effect, to be
modelled by a single variable (cf. Hausman and Woodward [1999], p. 564).
These solutions may be helpful in some cases; yet whether they always
work, I do not know. My approach, in any case, would be pragmatic. The
CMC should not be considered an a priori principle which is indissolubly
tied to the concept of causation. It is a substantive—and hence
useful—semantic constraint since it makes causal graphs more than mere
dots-and-arrows. But it is also fallible. As a result, when applying causal
nets for causal discovery, for causal reasoning, or for representing scientific
theories (in a certain context), one always runs the risk that the CMC is
violated (in that context). But this is no reason to dispense with the CMC
or with causal nets altogether. Their applicability should be checked on a
case-by-case basis. And if it is true that Woodward’s interventionism fits
many different disciplines, we need not despair. We have good reasons to
believe that my causal-structural approach fits many causal scientific
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theories.
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Notes
1Other structuralist accounts of classical genetics can be found in
(Balzer and Dawe [1986a], [1986b], [1997]).
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2A plant is true-breeding for some trait if, when self-fertilized, it only
produces offspring with this trait. This definition is not watertight. In a
given cross, all the offspring of non-true-breeding plants may, by accident,
have the parental phenotype. Yet the larger the set of offspring, the less
likely this is.
3I will not discuss Woodger’s work, since I will not incorporate any of
his views below. To some extent, his work also suffers from the common
lacuna to be presented in section 4. Where at first he paid relatively much
attention to causation ([1929], passim), he became more skeptical about
using causal language in science later on ([1952], p. 194).
4The T-theoretical/T-non-theoretical distinction should not be confused
with the observable/unobservable distinction. The two distinctions differ
both intensionally and extensionally (Dı´ez [2002], p. 15).
5Later, Kitcher ([1993], p. 9) rejected thinking of science as a series of
theories, defined as sets of statements, while at the same time sticking to
the view that explanatory schemata or patterns are implicit in scientific
practice ([1993], pp. 82–4).
6See also (Balzer and Dawe [1986a], pp. 58 and 62) and (Balzer and
Dawe [1986b], p. 179) for a similar reluctance to use causal language.
7Woodward ([2003], pp. 360–2) criticizes Kitcher’s theory as a theory of
causation and explanation. For criticisms of Kitcher’s theory as a theory of
unification and for my solution to the problems raised, see section 18.
8I would like to thank an anonymous referee for pressing me on this
issue.
9Causation is also deemed by many to play an important role in policy,
manipulation or intervention. The consensus view in philosophy of science
now is that causal relations are potentially exploitable for manipulation,
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policy and control, whereas spurious correlations are not; see for example
(Cartwright [1983]; Spirtes et al. [2000]; Pearl [2000]; Woodward [2003];
and Williamson [2005]). However, see (Leuridan et al. [2008]) for a specific
type of policy—selective policy—that is based on spurious correlations
such as the phenotypic distributions studied in classical genetics.
10For reasons of space, I will not systematically discuss the other
accounts of causation that are available on the philosophical market. The
two reasons to be discussed should suffice to show at least that
Woodward’s theory is a well-suited candidate for my purposes.
11In this definition, ‘independent’ means ‘probabilistically independent
according to P ’.
12The Causal Markov Condition does not rule out that P satisfies some
extra conditional or unconditional independence relations as well. To
simplify automated causal discovery, many search algorithms invoke
another, complementary assumption (Faithfulness) which rules out such
extra independence relations, see (Spirtes et al. [2000], p. 31). As I will not
touch upon the problem of causal discovery, I will not require that P and
G are faithful.
13When I will apply the definitions developed in this section and the next
one to the theory of classical genetics, I will not attach significance to the
order of the values in the elements of [U ] and hence will use a relaxed
notation.
14A bijection or bijective function f is a function which is both injective
(if f(x) = f(y), then it must be the case that x = y) and surjective (for
every element w in its range, there is an element v in its domain such that
w = f(v)). Source: http://mathworld.wolfram.com.
15Originally, credal nets were used to facilitate reasoning with imprecise
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probabilities (Cozman [2000]). This is not my aim in this paper.
16In the case of self-fertilization, the paternal and the maternal group are
the same. Still, it is convenient to represent such crosses by means of the
causal graph in figure 1.
17Morgan does not use ‘tall-producing allele’ or ‘short-producing allele’.
But his presentation of inheritance of flower-colour in four-o’clocks is
phrased in terms of ‘white-producing gene’ and ‘red-producing gene’
(Morgan [1928], p. 5–7).
18The combination principle should not be confused with the
COMBINATOR function in (Balzer and Lorenzano [2000]). In their
paper, the role of the gametes is not made explicit.
19Chance fertilization comes down to GC1 and GC2 being
probabilistically independent, which is true for any probability distribution
that satisfies the Causal Markov Condition relative to figure 1 (or to any
isomorphic graph), as can be seen by means of the d-separation criterion,
see (Pearl [2000], p. 16; Spirtes et al. [2000], p. 44).
20Strictly speaking, what is explained in classical genetics is not the data,
but what Bogen and Woodward ([1988], pp. 305–6) call ‘phenomena’.
Phenomena are relatively stable and repeatable and can hence be
predicted and explained by theories. Data are idiosyncratic to a particular
experimental setting and hence not predictable or systematically
explainable. For example, the phenotypic 3:1-ratio of tall versus short in
the F2 generation of cross 2 (section 8.1) is a phenomenon, an idealized
statistical generalization. Mendel’s data for that cross were 7871064 versus
277
1064 , which is close but not identical to 3:1 ([1965], p. 13). From here
onwards, by ‘data’ I will mean ‘phenomena’ in the above sense.
21Within the structuralist literature, there is some discussion as to
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whether all explanation has to be ‘ampliative’, i.e. whether it always
requires the addition of T-theoretical concepts. I would like to thank Jose´
Dı´ez for pointing this out.
22Abduction is a type of inference which is to be distinguished from
‘deduction’ and ‘induction’ (Douven [2011], section 1.1). Peirce ([CP],
5.189) defines ‘abduction’ as follows: ‘The surprising fact, C, is observed;
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course, Hence, there is reason
to suspect that A is true.’ In classical genetics, the inference from
phenotypes to genotypes was explicitly abductive and, given the
CG-theoretical nature of the GTi and GCi variables, based on the
explanatory principles of genetics itself. This does not mean, however, that
the explanation being given is ad hoc. The explanatory principles were
expected to hold in a wider range of related cases (see section 18 for an
explication of this ‘wider range of related cases’) and they were explicitly
tested by means of test crosses (see cross 3 below). In Waters’ words: they
were ‘local inferences to the best explanation’ ([2004], p. 802). (Inference
to the best explanation is a close nephew of abduction. A hypothesis A is
the best explanation for C if it outdoes all other explanations for C.)
23A reciprocal variant of cross 1, in which the pollen plants are short and
the egg plants are pure tall, gives the same results, as Mendel ([1865], p. 9)
discovered. These results can be explained by means of the very same set
of principles: there is a P ∈ P1 such that P (PT1 = short) = (PT2 =
tall) = 1.00, and P (GT1 = ss) = P (GT2 = tt) = 1.00. Given that P ∈ P1,
P (PT3 = tall) = 1.00. This also corresponds to the data. In cases of
sex-linked inheritance, however, reciprocal crosses do not result in identical
filial phenotypic distributions. Such cases can also be modelled in my
framework, but I will not do so here.
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24Where U = {A1, . . . , An} ⊆ V and b : V → V ′, let
b(U) = {b(A) | A ∈ U} and b′([U ]) = [b(A1)]× . . .× [b(An)].
25Generic credal nets not only resemble Darden’s abstract explanatory
pattern. They also resemble the structuralist notion of ‘theory-element’.
Moreover, they also resemble van Fraassen’s ‘model types’ (see van
Fraassen [1980], p. 44 and especially Lloyd [1983], pp. 118–21). However,
my account of explanation is more substantive (or less skeptical) than van
Fraassen’s ([1980], chapter 5) and Lloyd’s ([1983], pp. 116–7), without
being a truly general account of explanation (see sections 9 and 17; for a
defense of truly general accounts of explanation, see Nickel [2010]; for a
critique of his arguments, see Dı´ez et al. [forthcoming]).
26My framework cannot account for every single detail of Darden’s
analysis. For example, Darden ([1991], pp. 195–9) strongly clings to the
role of diagrammatic representations (e.g. pedigree diagrams) in the
history of classical genetics. Given that diagrams, and more broadly visual
representations, may play an important role in functional explanation
(Perini [2005a]), in scientific arguments (Perini [2005b]), and in
confirmation (Perini [2005c]), all of which are highly important in science,
the causal-structural account should be viewed as complementary to
(rather than a strict alternative for) Darden’s analysis.
27Darden’s ([2005]) main interest is in the relation between classical
genetics and molecular biology. She argues that these fields investigated
different, serially integrated, hereditary mechanisms and that molecular
biology offered a kind of explanatory extension of the field of classical
genetics, albeit via mechanism schemas instead of Kitcherian argument
patterns (Darden [2005], p. 350). For an interesting critique of the
explanatory extension view, based on the existence of ‘explanatory
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interference’ between the two fields, see (Baetu [2011]).
28I would like to thank both anonymous referees for pressing me on this
issue.
29Morgan does not use r and w (but black and white circles) for the red-
and white-producing alleles in his diagrammatic representation of these
crosses (Morgan [1928], p. 7).
30The reverse assumption would result in a different B ∈ B3.
31Note that P 1(V 1) and P 1(V 3) are different distributions, given that V 1
and V 3 are different sets of variables (they are not even value-isomorphic).
Likewise, B1 = 〈G3, P 1〉 with P 1 ∈ P3 should not be confused with
B1 = 〈G1, P 1〉 with P 1 ∈ P1.
32Monohybrid crosses with codominance, instead of incomplete
dominance, can also be represented by causal nets that are
distribution-identical to some member of Bβ. This is in line with the fact
that to distinguish between codominance and incomplete dominance, one
has to invoke a theory (at the molecular level) other than classical
genetics. In (Morgan [1928]), no exemplar of codominance is mentioned.
33See also (Kitcher [1993], pp. 256–63) for a more elaborate account of
anomaly-resolution in terms of the deletion/alteration of patterns (or
‘constraints’) in an escape tree. Darden ([1991]) does not discuss the status
of incomplete dominance as a model anomaly.
34The status of the principle of complete dominance was hotly debated in
the early days of classical genetics. The question was whether it is a
universal law. Mendel ([1865]) only discussed crosses with complete
dominance but there is no clear indication that he deemed complete
dominance a universal phenomenon—quite to the contrary. Nevertheless
De Vries ([1900], p. 110) took it to be a (nearly) universal phenomenon.
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Correns ([1900], pp. 122 and 132), by contrast, mentioned several failures
of complete dominance. Weldon ([1902], pp. 229, 236–52) attributed the
‘Law of Dominance’ a central place in Mendel’s theory and showed that it
was plagued by exceptions. Bateson ([1902], pp. 117–8) replied to
Weldon’s arguments by denying the principle of complete dominance this
central place. Hence exceptions to it should not count heavily against the
theory of Mendelian genetics.
35Mendel ([1865], p. 17–23) also performed multihybrid crosses with
three or more characters and independent assortment. Morgan ([1928], p.
10) mentions these only in passing (but see Morgan [1919], pp. 71–2 for an
example). Crosses with three or more independent pairs of traits can be
easily incorporated in my framework, but I will not do it here.
36For the extensions of [GTi] and [GCi], see (Morgan [1928], p. 9, figure
8).
37The text in (Morgan [1928], p. 11, figure 9) gives the impression that
the cross concerned purple and white flowers, instead of purple and red
ones. This conflicts with Morgan’s main text and with (Darden [1991], p.
122).
38Morgan ([1928], p. 11) uses pictorial elements instead of letters to
denote these alleles.
39The calculations for the other phenotypes are somewhat more
elaborate, given the multiple realizability of dominant phenotypic traits.
40Morgan does not discuss this particular cross, but an analogous way of
reasoning can be found in (Morgan [1928], pp. 16–7).
41The if -direction has been illustrated by means of the data from
Bateson and Punnett. For the only if -direction, suppose first that
GTi = GGWW or any other doubly homozygous value. Then (absent
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mutation) only one kind of gametes can be produced, in casu GCi = GW .
Second, suppose that GTi = GGWw or any other singly homozygous
value. Then one chromosome will carry G and W . The other chromosome
will carry G and w. Part of the gametes (say, x%) will not be the result of
crossing-over. Half of them (x2%) will be GW , the other half will be Gw.
The rest of the gametes, (100− x)%, will be the result of crossing-over.
Half of these, 100−x2 %, will be Gw; the other half will be GW .
Consequently, x2 +
100−x
2 = 50% of the gametes will be GW , the other half
will be Gw. Hence, the gametes of both doubly homozygous plants and
singly heterozygous plants are as in the case of independent assortment
(even though they result from strongly different underlying mechanisms).
42Sturtevant equated one map unit (mu) with 1 percent recombination.
In honour of Morgan’s work, map units are often referred to as
centimorgans (cM). (Klug et al. [2006], p. 105) Map distances are not
absolute distances, since not all parts of the chromosome are evenly prone
to interchange. Moreover, a crossover event in one region of the
chromosome may inhibit a second event in nearby regions (positive
interference). Positive interference increases as the genes in question are
closer. This may be explained by physical constraints preventing the
formation of closely aligned chiasmata. (Klug et al. [2006], p. 114)
43Obviously, cases of incomplete dominance, codominance, etc. also
conform to Morgan’s observation, but the corresponding dihybrid crosses
are represented by generic credal nets other than Bδ.
44Stability is a gradual notion. It pertains to the conditions upon which
a regularity is contingent. Strength also is a gradual notion. It can be
thought of in terms of covariance or correlation, with deterministic
regularities being a limit case. (Leuridan [2010], pp. 324–5; Mitchell [1997],
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pp. S477–8, [2000], pp. 259-63)
45Although classical genetics’ causal nets are possible realizations in
which all of the theory’s valid sentences are satisfied (cf. Suppes [1969], p.
24), and hence ‘things depicted by classical genetics’, cf. (Balzer et al.
[1987], p. 2), they are themselves abstract representations of the real-world
states of affairs.
46One pattern is more stringent than another one if the conditions it sets
on instantiations are more difficult to satisfy (Kitcher [1989], p. 433).
47See also (Ma¨ki [1990]; Marchionni [2005]). Woodward ([2003], p. 362)
calls this kind of unification physical unification, but he and Ma¨ki do not
refer to each other’s writings.
48The notion of ontological unification is not wedded to an ontic account
of explanation, as is evident from Ma¨ki’s use of ‘the referential and
representational capabilities of theories’. Ontological unification and ontic
explanation should not be conflated.
49Alleles and genotypes may be considered properties (of organisms)
instead of objects. Then in a sense Kitcher’s schematic sentence ‘There are
two alleles A, a. A is dominant, a is recessive.’ is a second-order sentence. I
write ‘in a sense’, since the quantifier indirectly refers to filling instructions
(A and a are dummy letters, not common second order variables).
50Credal nets here are defined in terms of Woodwardian causal relations
(section 6) and laws or explanatory principles that can be conceived of in
the sense of Mitchell’s pragmatic laws (section 17), not in terms of
mechanisms. I have argued elsewhere, however, that there need not be any
tension between the former and the latter (Leuridan [2010], section 7).
51This claim should be nuanced. (I would like to thank an anonymous
referee for pressing me on this issue.) Figure 1 represents only certain
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aspects of this common causal mechanism, to wit the qualitative relations
between those properties of the entities, processes, and powers that can be
represented by the variables GT1, . . . , PT3. That is not surprising: all
representations are abstractions that leave out part of their subject matter.
52For a broader conception of the domain of classical genetics, see
(Waters [2004]).
53This same intuition can be found in the works of Bartelborth ([1996],
[2002]), Sintonen ([1989]) and Lloyd ([1983]).
54I will not discuss the tenability of the Faithfulness Condition, as I did
not assume it.
55If X and Y would be independent conditional on C, then
P (xy | c) = P (x | c)× P (y | c) for all x ∈ [X], y ∈ [Y ] and for all c ∈ [C]
(provided P (c) 6= 0). In this case, however, P (X = 1, Y = 1 | C = 1) =
0.8 6= P (X = 1 | C = 1)× P (Y = 1 | C = 1) = 0.64 (where ‘X = 1’ means
that X is present, ‘Y = 1’ means that Y is present, and ‘C = 1’ means
that the production process is active).
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